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ABSTRACT
The Heinrich Böll Stiftung (hbs) has conducted this research to 
better understand the impact of the current political situation on 
the human rights’ issue of Palestinians in East Jerusalem in general, 
and of the vulnerable groups in particular. In doing so, this study 
analyzes the current situation of East Jerusalem from different 
perspectives: political, social and economic, using the case study 
and life story approach, in addition to in-depth interviews with key 
informants. The research observations highlight the complexity 
of the current geopolitical context of East Jerusalem such as the 
annexation, the construction of the Jewish settlements and the 
separation Wall, as well as the Israeli policies that discriminate 
against the Palestinian Jerusalemites. The analysis identifies on the 
one hand, the imposed Israeli measures that violate human rights 
at different levels, and on the other hand, the structural macro-
social forces in the Palestinian society that influence the level of 
respect of human rights, in order to differentiate between what’s 
imposed by the state of Israel and what is culturally inherited. 
The study concludes that the vulnerable groups are subjected to 
these two levels of violations in a way that makes the mission of 
advocating for them more complex. The study also differentiates 
between the Israeli policies that are comprehensive for all the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites; i.e. the regulations of the “Permanent 
Residence” status, and those that were set for particular areas or 
circumstances such as the policies regarding the areas within the 
municipal boundaries but outside the segregation wall, and the 
collective punishment to a certain group of people. Furthermore, the 
analysis highlights the important role played by the Palestinian civil 
society organizations that emerged and developed in the absence 
of the state, discussing their history, challenges and scope of work. 
A short discussion is also introduced over foreign aid and the vital 
role played by International Organizations. The study recommends 
that the intervention of the international community at the political 
level is essential in order to promote the respect of the rights for the 
vulnerable Palestinian communities in East Jerusalem.
Keywords: East Jerusalem, Israeli Policies, Human rights, Vulnerable 
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InTRoDUCTIon
The EU funded project “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable 
Palestinian Women and Children in East Jerusalem” covers a variety 
of programs. These programs aim at improving social, psychosocial, 
economic, cultural opportunities and the well-being of vulnerable 
children, youth, and women in occupied East Jerusalem, as well as 
contributing to the enhancement of their political and human rights. 
This action is coordinated by hbs and implemented by its partner 
organizations: Artlab, the Arab Center for Agricultural Development 
(ACAD), Sawa – All the Women Together Today and Tomorrow, Right 
to Play, and War Child Holland, all of who carry out a variety of 
activities in their respective fields1.  hbs has been working in close 
coordination with its partners during the identification phase. The 
action has been designed through a participatory process with all 
the involved partners, as well as receiving inputs from other local 
partner organizations. These organizations come together in the 
three years action (2014-2017) to strengthen the rights of women, 
youth and vulnerable children and improve their quality of life, 
safety, and status in the family and community in East Jerusalem. 
In the framework of this project, hbs has conducted this research to 
study the impact of the current situation on vulnerable Palestinian 
groups in East Jerusalem in order to explore the situation of the 
disenfranchised clusters and advocate for them2, Moreover the 
study aims at attaining specific recommendations to better channel 
future aid to civil society organizations (CSOs), and to ensure 
efficiency and sustainability of the provided services. Therefore, 
within the case study approach, this research utilizes the life story 
method to collect personal level data and carries out in-depth 
interviews with key informants to collect community level data. 
Participant observation and group discussion methods are also 
applied, as well as a review of previous studies that tackle human 
rights violations and civil society organizations in the oPt. However, 
1 See https://ps.boell.org/sites/default/files/hbs_eu_project_newslet-
ter_english.pdf 
2 See https://ps.boell.org/sites/default/files/up-
loads/2015/10/151025_eu_text_for_website_long_form.pdf 
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the question that arises here is what is exactly meant by “the current 
situation in East Jerusalem”? To answer this question, and in the 
belief of the importance of understanding the different components 
that have a role in determining the context, it is important to look 
into the historical, geopolitical and socio-economic factors that 
shaped the contemporary context of East Jerusalem. Thus, after 
presenting the research methodology, a short historical review 
of the most important events that had a role in determining the 
context is presented. The section demonstrates the complexity of 
the East Jerusalem context which started prior to 1967, the illegal 
annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel, followed by the construction 
of the Jewish settlements inside and around the city, to the first 
intifada, and the consequent peace agreement. It also highlights 
the important details of the Oslo Accords (1993); the creation of 
the PNA and the partitioning of the West Bank into areas A, B and C. 
The section then discusses the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and 
the Israeli control over the Palestinian movement from that era up 
to the construction of the Segregation Wall in 2002. 
The next section discusses the violations of human rights against 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem, differentiating between the human 
rights violations practiced by the state of Israel and those culturally 
inherited. The first part tackles the Israeli policies in constraining 
the development of Palestinian neighborhoods, while constructing 
Jewish settlements. The second part discusses violence, arrests 
and collective punishment practiced against Palestinians, revealing 
violations of human rights as based on figures provided by human 
rights agencies. It also analyses the last uprising in terms of 
reasons, motivations, feelings and its religious dimension. The third 
part in this section tackles the inherited human rights violations 
starting with the “Gender Inequality” dimension, which focuses on 
female education, social control, the inheritance rights of women, 
domestic violence and sexual harassment within the Palestinian 
community; highlighting the reasons and impediments that hinder 
access to professional help. The “Social Fragmentation” dimension 
with an elaboration of the term “stranger” and its embedded roots 
in the Palestinian culture, the change that has affected the social 
relation map due to the different types of the civil status of the 
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residents of East Jerusalem and its suburbs is also presented and 
explained to be followed by a section on the diffusion of drugs in 
East Jerusalem neighborhoods in terms of reasons, motivations 
and negative consequences on the vulnerable groups.
The last section highlights the role of the Civil Society Organizations 
in serving the Palestinian community, particularly in East Jerusalem. 
It starts with the definition of “Civil Society”, which reveals that the 
concept of “Civil Society” has been always related to, or worked 
independently from the “State”; therefore, the “State” and “Civil 
society” concepts are always intertwined, and this raises the 
question: “Is there a Palestinian Civil Society while there is no 
Palestinian State?. This is the debate that this section will attempt 
to briefly highlight. The second part demonstrates the formation of 
the Palestinian civil society overtime, explaining its development, 
tasks and functionality. The third part discusses the debate over 
foreign aid dependency after Oslo highlighting the important role 
of the CSOs played in East Jerusalem where the unique political 
context produces a two-fold set of challenges; the risks that face the 
CSOs legitimate existence and activities, and the increasing social 
exclusion that creates a growing demand for services and human 
rights protection activities. It also displays the group discussions 
with partner organizations of the “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable 
Palestinian Women and Children in East Jerusalem” project. The 
meeting took place at the (hbs) office to explore the complicity from 
the point of view of those who work in the field, highlighting their 
objectives, the target groups and the difficulties they faced before 
and during the implementation of the project, in addition to their 
suggestions for optimal results. The section concludes that in the 
Palestinian case, specifically in East Jerusalem, it is not possible to 
separate humanitarian affairs and the socio-economic status from 
the political context; without a comprehensive political solution, the 
status of human rights will deteriorate all the more.
The conclusion section discusses the political situation and 
concludes that the International Community’s intervention at the 
political level is essential to force Israel to see Palestinians as 
human beings and respect their rights despite the ongoing conflict. 
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Israel should protect the Jerusalemites and ensure that they enjoy 
the same rights and welfare just like all Israeli residents without 
any kind of discrimination against them. On the humanitarian level, 
the International Organizations’ role is vital, not only because they 
are the only player in East Jerusalem for the time being, but also 
because their services became crucial to slow down, if not prevent, 
further deterioration especially at the social level. Therefore, the 
International Donor Communities’ financial support to the CSOs is 
essential.
It also presents recommendations to enhance the rights of the 
vulnerable groups through CSOs programs and recommendations 
to help the international and the local civil society organizations to 
alleviate the barriers to reach their ultimate goals.
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ReSeARCH STATMenT
This research seeks to understand the impact of the current 
political situation on human rights related issues to the Palestinian 
people in East Jerusalem in general, and the vulnerable groups in 
particular. The research highlights the imposed Israeli measures 
that violate human rights. It focuses on the structural macro-social 
forces that influence the level of human rights, in addition to the 
important role played by the International Organizations and the 
Civil Society Organizations in advancing these rights especially in 
East Jerusalem’s communities, whether inside or outside the Wall. 
The focus is also on the technical and social barriers that withhold 
the prevalence of effective and sustainable human rights. The study 
addresses all these issues to better understand the vulnerable 
groups’ needs and aspirations, and the obstacles they face, by 
discussing the means to overcome them.
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MeTHoDoloGY 
The general objective of this research is to look at the current 
situation of rights among vulnerable groups (especially women and 
children) in East Jerusalem, in the framework of the (hbs) EU funded 
project “Advancing the rights of vulnerable Palestinian Women and 
Children in East Jerusalem”. In doing so, this study analyzes the 
current situation of East Jerusalem from different perspectives; 
political, social and economic. The research method firstly depends 
on the existing secondary data; i.e. previous studies that tackle 
human rights, vulnerable women, children and youth, especially 
the ones focusing on girls and women at risk of suffering from 
gender based violence, and secondly, conducts studies on female 
entrepreneurs, children with disabilities, small scale community 
based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) working with women and children in East Jerusalem. 
After the examination of these studies, further investigations 
were made to better understand the situation of the vulnerable 
groups in the context-specific settings. Therefore the Case Study 
approach was used for its ability to investigate important topics 
not easily addressed by other methods, especially as this research 
involves descriptive questions such as “What happened?” and the 
explanatory question “How and why did this happen?”3 and for 
its ability to examine in-depth, a case within its real-life context 
(Yin, 2004). It also illuminated a particular situation and helped 
to make direct observations and collect data in natural settings 
(Bromley, 1986). Other methods within the qualitative case study 
analytical approach were also applied; the in-depth key informants’ 
interviews and the life story qualitative methods in addition to the 
direct observations. According to Dilley (2004), interviewing helps 
to understand the context of study subjects’ behavior and thus 
provides a way for a researcher to realize the meaning of that 
behavior.
For the reasons above, the ‘in-depth Interviews’ were carried 
out by ‘key informants’, who have expertise in collecting data at 
3 See (Shavelson & Townes, 2002).
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the community level; such as representatives of international 
organizations, civil society organizations; especially those whose 
work is designated to handle issues related to human rights, local 
socio-economic development and education. In addition to meeting 
with the national representative, ex-minister of East Jerusalem 
Affairs, to better understand the degree of the Palestinian 
Authority’s involvement in East Jerusalem’s affairs, specifically 
in regards to the vulnerable groups. Moreover, the ‘Life Story 
Interview’ method was used to collect personal-level data, because 
storytelling is a fundamental form of human communication 
(Atkinson, 1998); it can serve an essential function in our lives as 
we often think and speak in story form, and it can bring meaning 
to people’s lives, thus giving a narrative account of an event, an 
experience, or a memory. ‘Life Stories’ make links across life phases 
and cohort generations revealing historical shift in culture, and help 
in establishing collective memories as well4. They usually end up 
as a short or mini autobiography, full of information on research 
interests and questions. Hence, the life story interviews that were 
collected for this study probed deeper into the personal life and 
feelings of the interviewees, in a way that helped the researcher to 
understand certain social actions within the wider social/political 
context of East Jerusalem. It was also an appropriate way to better 
understand the past because it addressed lives as a whole or 
at significant periods of a life time (Ibid). In this context, the life 
story interviews focused on the period after the occupation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967 till present. The interviewees were selected from 
all the geographical areas of East Jerusalem; inside the walls of the 
old city as well as the outside, including East Jerusalem suburbs, 
which are now located inside the segregation wall; like Silwan, At-
Tur and Isawiya, as well as suburbs located outside the segregation 
Wall; like Kufr ‘Aqab, Shua’fat refugee camp, and suburbs that were 
4  See (Plummer, 2001).
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not annexed to East Jerusalem after the 1967 war, yet considered 
as part the West Bank such as al-‘Eizariyah (Bethany)and Abu-Dis.
Ethnographic methods relay on “Participant Observation” 
substantially or partly5 as it establishes a place in the natural 
setting for long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and 
represent the social life and social process that occur in that setting. 
Therefore, the “Participant Observation” data collection tool was 
used in order to connect the data that was collected and the other 
two methods with the facts on the ground. In addition the ‘Group 
Discussion’ method was arranged; first with the five partners of the 
hbs project, and then with the seven CBOs and with a group of the 
beneficiaries and representatives of the ‘International Community’ 
(the donors) for brain-storming and feedback to better understand 
the practical part of both, the providers of the service and the 
beneficiaries in order to enhance the research recommendations. 
Each one of these four data collection tools focused on different 
aspects of the current situation regarding vulnerable groups, i.e. 
the geopolitical and socio-economic general situation level, the 
personal level, the professional level and the international level. 
Thus, combining the data from these different perspectives enabled 
the study to give a holistic insightful analysis of the situation, as 
well as clear messages and recommendations. Other sources for 
information were explored, i.e. newspapers, United Nation Agencies’ 
publications, and Human Rights Organizations reports that cover 
many aspects in the lives of vulnerable groups (women and children) 
in East Jerusalem.
5 See Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994
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ReSeARCH ConTeXT
The current geopolitical context of East Jerusalem is very complex; 
the annexation, the Jewish settlements, the segregation wall, 
and the Israeli policies that discriminate against Palestinians, 
all create a difficult environment. Since the beginning of the 
occupation, Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of 
dunams6 throughout the West Bank, with the primary objective 
of establishing Israeli settlements7 and reserves of land for their 
future expansion (Bimkom & B’Tselem, 2002). The settlements 
in East Jerusalem form two rings around the city; the inner ring 
(the municipality boundaries pre-1967) and the outer ring around 
the new boundaries of “Greater Jerusalem”. These settlements 
are isolating East Jerusalem from the surrounding West Bank 
suburbs on the one hand, and dividing the West Bank in half on 
the other, thus strangulating the socio-economic role of East 
Jerusalem as the center for all trade and movement routes in 
Palestine8. Furthermore, the Palestinians’ movement is controlled 
by a sophisticated checkpoint regime that serves like gates in the 
concrete wall which separates East Jerusalem’s neighborhoods 
from its center. Moreover, the Israeli policies discriminating 
against Palestinian Jerusalemites; Palestinian communities inside 
East Jerusalem became marginalized by a set of common Israeli 
policies. However and at the same time, different sets of policies 
for each community are being applied; meaning that the Old City’s 
6 every four dunams= 1 acre
7 Israel has taken control of hundreds of thousands of dunams 
throughout the West Bank by means of a complex legal-bureaucratic 
mechanism whose central element is the declaration and registration 
of land as «state land.» Israel uses three complementary methods 
to seize control of land: requisition for military needs, declaration 
of land as abandoned property and the expropriation of land for 
public needs. In addition, Israel has also helped its Jewish citizens to 
purchase land on the free market. Using these methods, Israel has 
seized control of some fifty percent of the West Bank, excluding east 
Jerusalem. See (lein, 2002) and land grab report on https://www.
btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf
8 See PASSIA Arab Jerusalem Rehabilitation Program http://www.
passia.org/jerusalem/rehabilitation/index.html 
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people problems are different than those of Silwan’s or Kafr A’keb, 
depending on the geographic location.
Since sociological concepts are produced in relation to a socio-
historical context9, it is important to trace back the influential 
historical events that shaped the context.  Therefore, the next 
section tries to give a short clear holistic picture of East Jerusalem 
to define the research statement. 
Political Background
The main objective of this section is the analysis of the historical, 
political and socio-economic factors that characterize the context 
of East Jerusalem. This section starts with a brief historical 
review of the city of Jerusalem from separation, to unification, till 
its expansion at the expense of the West Bank neighborhoods; it 
attempts to explain the complexity and the impact on its residents 
including vulnerable groups. This preface will enable us to confront 
this context with the analysis of the conducted research in the 
empirical section.
Jerusalem Before and After the 1967 War
Jerusalem is a cornerstone in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and the 
multitude of holy sites in the city, for the three major monotheistic 
religions (Christianity, Islam and Judaism), have contributed 
towards making the city’s politics extremely impulsive (AIC, 2007). 
Under the partition plan of 1947, of the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 18110, Jerusalem was to be internationalized 
as a corpus separatum – a separated body – and placed under a 
special international regime to be administered by the United 
Nations Trusteeship Council. However and as Derejko (2009: 
33) wrote “rather than through the political will of its residents, 
the dictates of the international community, or the principles of 
9 Passeron 1991; Kalberg 1994: This quote was taken from (Beinin & 
Vairel, 2013: 8).
10 Un General Assembly, future government of Palestine, 29 november 
1947, A/ReS/181 
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international law, the fate of Jerusalem was determined through 
military conquest”11. As a result of the creation of the state of 
Israel on the major part of historic Palestine and the ensuing 
war of 1948, the remaining Palestinian territories were under the 
control of the neighboring countries: the West Bank including East 
Jerusalem was annexed by Jordan, while Egypt took control over 
the Gaza Strip. This division of the city of Jerusalem, western side 
under the Israeli control, and an Eastern side, including the Old 
City, under the Jordanian rule ended nineteen years later. In 196712 
Israel occupied the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip. While the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remained under 
military occupation, Israel annexed East Jerusalem and some 64 
square kilometers of its suburbs, until then considered part of the 
West Bank. For many observers, the new municipal boundaries were 
dictated by both strategic and demographic considerations in order 
to allow future expansion of Jewish communities in the open space 
around the city13. Undeniably, Israeli governments consecutively 
built 12 Jewish neighborhoods inside the Jerusalem municipality’s 
new boundaries and increased the Jewish communities in East 
Jerusalem as shown in the maps below. 
Figure 1: Jerusalem map before 1967 War,    Figure 3: Jerusalem map now
Source: BBC News, Key Maps/ Middle East Facts/http://www.mefacts.com/cached.
asp?x_id=10930
11 See “Urban Planning and the Displacement of Palestinians within and 
from occupied east Jerusalem” by nathan Derejko (2009). http://
civilcivilcoalition-jerusalem.org/system/files/documents/aggres-
sive_urbanism.pdf
12 In addition to the Sinai Peninsula of egypt, and the Golan Heights of 
Syria
13 See (Allegra, 2012: 15).
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However, the Palestinian Jerusalemites were not granted equal 
Israeli citizenship. Instead, the residents were given “Permanent 
Residence” cards (Blue ID), granting them certain “rights” that 
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were not offered. 
For example, Jerusalemites receive services such as social 
assistance, national insurance, health and education services 
offered by the municipality. Furthermore, because they are under 
Israeli jurisdiction and not under military rule like those of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, they can benefit from a certain degree of 
legal protection and freedom of mobility14.
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza were given an Orange 
color ID with no such benefits, which was replaced by a Green 
color one after the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993. 
Israel controlled the movement of people by a complicated and 
strict crossing the borders system between Israel and Jordan. 
Conversely, borders between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza 
were opened, and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories including 
East Jerusalem were able to move almost freely in Israel15. However, 
the economic relationship was marked by great dependency on the 
Israeli economy; and Palestinian markets became almost restricted 
to Israeli goods and commodities only. A significant portion of 
the Palestinian labor force became dependent on the Israeli labor 
market for employment due to the escalating unemployment rates 
after the war.16 Furthermore an Israeli urgent demand for workhands 
mainly in the construction and agriculture domains became evident 
during the economic boom that had started in Israel, whereby it then 
granted work opportunities for Palestinian laborers, mostly in the 
construction of the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories. 
Culturally, East Jerusalem functioned as the metropolitan hub for 
the West Bank prior to 1967 and Palestinians could move freely 
14 See http://www.passia.org/jerusalem/publications/J_P_Dyn_Res_txt.
htm 
15 “The policy of «open bridges» referred solely to the decision to allow 
movement from the West Bank to Jordan via the bridges crossing the 
Jordan River, the «open bridges» policy became a prong in a greater 
political program designed to eliminate barriers and integrate the 
Palestinian and Israeli economies” (Gross, 1999: footnote 1550).
16 Hilal, 2007)
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between East Jerusalem and its surrounding areas; their familial, 
economic and cultural bonds extended throughout the entire West 
Bank. No barriers blocked the flow of people, commercial goods or 
social engagement and exchange; this situation has continued till 
Israel started to implement restrictions on free movement starting 
from the first Intifada in 1987. The de facto annexation of East 
Jerusalem was formalized in 1980 when the Knesset enacted the 
‘Basic Law’, which stated that ‘Jerusalem, complete and united, 
is the capital of Israel’. However, as long as the city was open, the 
inhabitants of East Jerusalem were not aware of the consequences 
and it never occurred to them that their city might ever be separated 
from the West Bank17.
Today East Jerusalem is almost completely detached from the 
surrounding Palestinian areas of the West Bank. The closure 
procedures started in March 1993 with the checkpoint regime 
that was followed by the construction of the Wall18. The economic 
integration started to shrink with the beginning of the first Intifada 
in 1987 (Gross, 1999). The first Intifada, for many observers and 
politicians, was one of the most important collective nonviolent 
resistance actions that the Palestinians had in the twentieth 
century besides the revolution of the 1936-3919. Palestinians were 
determined in their civilian, nonmilitary measures of struggle20; 
and within weeks a clandestine coordinating committee emerged 
to help sustain the ongoing strike that started with the closure 
of shops, leading to commercial and general strikes in addition 
to mass demonstrations21. The first Intifada created a new form 
of Palestinian leadership; Al-Shabab (Young Men) instead of the 
Palestinian Notables who traditionally played the role of informal 
mediators between the Palestinians and the Israeli administration 
17 See( Yousef, 2011).
18 See (lagerquist, P. 2004). fencing the last sky: excavating Palestine 
after Israel›s “separation wall”
19 The 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine was a nationalist uprising 
by Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory Palestine against British colonial 
rule, as a demand for independence and opposition to mass Jewish 
immigration
20 See (King& Carter, 2009).
21 See (lustick 1993: 561). 
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in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the Occupied Territories. 
This also led to minimizing the role of the head of the clan or the 
extended family.22 The “Orient House” played a significant role and 
became the leading Palestinian political institution in Jerusalem. 
The late Faisal al-Husseini and many others had worked constantly 
to support Jerusalemites and strengthen their steadfastness in the 
city. The first Intifada gave birth to the peace process and the two-
state solution with the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel 
and the PLO in September 1993. Since then East Jerusalem and the 
Palestinian struggle entered a new phase.
The Oslo Accords, the Second Intifada and the 
Segregation wall
The overarching logic of the Oslo Accords could be summarized with 
Gordon’s words:
“Israel transferred all responsibilities relating to the management 
of the population to the Palestinians themselves while preserving 
control of Palestinian space” (Gordon, 2008: 35).
The Oslo secret peace talks between Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO)23 were concluded with the 
announcement of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in 199324. 
The DOP formed the basis for further negotiations leading to the 
22 See (Allegra, 2010). 
23 The Palestine liberation organization (Plo) is an organization found-
ed in 1964 with the purpose of the «liberation of Palestine» through 
armed struggle. It is recognized as the «sole legitimate representa-
tive of the Palestinian people». It has enjoyed observer status at the 
United nations since 1974. The Plo was considered by the United 
States and Israel to be a terrorist organization until the Madrid Con-
ference in 1991. In 1993, the Plo recognized Israel›s right to exist in 
peace, accepted Un Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, and 
rejected «violence and terrorism»; in response, Israel officially recog-
nized the Plo as the representative of the Palestinian people.
24 See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrange-
ments on  www.cfr.org/israel/oslo-accords.../p9674
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Israeli-Palestinian “Interim Agreement”25 of 1995, and the creation 
of the “Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority”26 that was 
supposed to end in 1999 when a permanent agreement would 
be reached27. The Oslo agreement reformulated the structure of 
jurisdiction in the West Bank through the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority in 1994. The West Bank, excluding the Jewish 
settlements and military locations, was supposed to be transferred 
to the Palestinians in three portions under the arrangement of 
redeployment (one  area every six months). To facilitate this 
process, it was agreed that the West Bank was to be divided into 
three areas: A, B, and C with different civil and security authorization 
(Jamal, 2009). Area C was supposed to be transferred to B, then 
B to A, until the whole area becomes A under the control of the 
Palestinian Authority (Abu Zayyad, November 1, 2016). However, 
the implementation of the process – that should have led to a 
Palestinian state by the end of 1999, was halted in the middle, and 
the West Bank remained divided into these three administrative 
areas until today. A complex “zone system” was developed that 
fragmented the West Bank and more precisely the Jerusalem 
eastern suburbs according to the diverse operating authorities in 
these areas28. It is noteworthy that the negotiations regarding East 
Jerusalem were postponed till the third year of the process, with no 
jurisdiction for the PNA in the city.
Transit into East Jerusalem-Israel was limited to the few 
Palestinians with permits issued by the Israeli military authority. 
This development of a “zone system” contributed to the formation 
of a psychological barrier between the city and its West Bank 
suburbs, a barrier that after the second intifada evolved into the 
segregation wall29.
25 See “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip (“oslo 2”— 9/28/95)” https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.
org/jsource/Peace/interimtoc.html
26 The situation is the same since then till the time being.
27 See (Shlaim, 2005). 
28 figure 2: The Wall, checkpoints and Arias A, B and C in the West Bank. 
Source: Applied Research Institute, www.arij.org  
29 See hbs news letter (2015): Raja Khalidi “Views from Jerusalem”. 
https://ps.boell.org/sites/default/files/hbs_eu_project_newsletter_
english.pdf 
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The failure of the Oslo Accords led to the outbreak of the second 
Intifada in 2000, which entailed a wave of violence and counter 
violence on both sides. Although the control over the Palestinian 
movement into East Jerusalem and Israel started during the 
first Intifada, yet, this controlling system gradually became more 
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complex and effective since the beginning of the second Intifada. The 
apparatus of control included a permit system, physical obstacles 
known as closures and restricted roads. The tactic of military 
“curfew”30 was used extensively, late in the year 2001, widespread 
sieges on Palestinian people centers were imposed resulting in 
virtual “town arrest” for most people in the West Bank. Checkpoints 
and roadblocks were erected inside and between Palestinian cities 
including entrances to East Jerusalem31, subjecting all people and 
vehicles to security inspection as shown in figure 2. 
In April 2002, the Israeli government’s Ministerial Committee on 
National Security Affairs decided to construct a barrier “to hinder, 
disrupt, and prevent the penetration of terrorist activity from Judea 
and Samaria32 into Israel”33. Separation has been achieved via a six 
to eight-meter- high concrete wall that takes a long and convoluted 
route. The Wall was not built on the pre-1967 boundaries; eighty-
five percent of the Wall is located within the West Bank territories, 
mostly in the areas were sixty of the Israeli settlements are located 
(twelve of them in East Jerusalem) separating them from the rest 
of the West Bank and connecting them with Israel34. The length of 
the Wall, whether already built, under construction or in planning, 
is 709 kilometers, double the length of the Green Line 35(B’Tselem, 
2012). 
The Wall has turned the West Bank into a fragmented set of social 
and economic enclaves cut off from one another (World Bank, 
2010). About 12 percent of West Bank Palestinians are now living 
in a closed military zone along the Jordan Valley region, or encircled 
by the Wall in their villages and towns, or isolated between the Wall 
30 long-term lockdown of civilian areas
31 The Wall, checkpoints and Arias A, B and C in the West Bank; source: 
Applied Research Institute, www.arij.org.
32 Judea and Samaria are the Hebrew name for the West Bank.
33 Ministerial Committee on national Security Affairs, Decision no. 64/B 
dated 14 April 2002.
34 Bimkom & B’Tselem, 2005
35 The Green line refers to the 1949 armistice line between Israel and 
the West Bank. The name derives from the green ink used to draw the 
line on the map.
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and the Green Line (Grassroots Palestine, 2010)36. The part of the 
Wall in and around East Jerusalem is approximately 90 kilometers 
long37 with twelve official gates; only four of which are open to 
Palestinians and the rest are reserved for the settlers’ use only38. 
Stage A was approved in June 2002; it includes two sections, one 
north of Jerusalem that extends from the Ofer army base in the 
west to the Qalandiya checkpoint in the east. The other section, 
south of Jerusalem; it runs from the Tunnels Road in the west, to 
Beit Sahour in the east. Both sections were about 10 Km each, and 
were completed in July 2003 (B’Tselem, 2011)39. Three months later 
the “Jerusalem Envelope” plan was approved to surround the city 
with walls from the south, east and the north (Hever40, 2007). 
In April 2006, in the Ma’ale Adumim area, the government approved 
an altered route that breaches the West Bank by some 14 kilometers 
east of the Green Line, and 11 kilometers east of Jerusalem’s post-
1967 municipal border41. It leaves on its “Israeli” side most of the 
jurisdiction area of Ma’ale Adumim settlement, including E1; Kfar 
Adumim, Almon, Nofey Prat, Alon, and Qedar settlements; and the 
Mishor Adumim industrial zone (B’Tselem, 2009). The planned 
route will create a 6,400-hectare enclave, which, in addition to 
the settlements, includes the Palestinian village of A-Za’ayem 
(3,500 residents) and 3,000 Bedouins from the al-Ka’abaneh, as-
Sawahrah, and Jahalin tribes (Ibid). This means that thousands of 
Palestinians will find themselves within the so-called “seam zone” 
i.e. trapped between the Green Line and the Wall and they will be 
obliged to acquire permits to continue to live in their homes and 
36 The Israeli government also built 14 alternative “fabric of life” roads 
to facilitate movement of the Palestinians between their cities and 
towns. These roads are usually longer than the original roads, time 
consuming with extra cost.
37 See (Cohen, 2005).
38 See (Aronson, 2006).
39 See B›tselem Website (1 Jan 2011): http://www.btselem.org/separa-
tion_barrier/jerusalem
40 http://www.ochaoPt.org/documents/oPt_econ_aic_separation_wall_
eastjerus_apr_2007.pdf 
41 Israeli Government Decision no. 4783, “Amended Route of the Securi-
ty fence”, April 30, 2006.
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villages42. Although Israel stated that the Wall was built for security 
reasons to prevent “Palestinian terrorists” from entering Israel; 
the Wall in East Jerusalem suggests otherwise, especially since it 
separates Palestinians from Palestinians. While the second Intifada 
ended after the death of Yaser Arafat, the checkpoint regime did not 
come to an end and neither was the construction of the Segregation 
wall interrupted.
Figure 3: The Separation Barrier in East Jerusalem, Source: B’Tselem, 2008
The Current Situation for the Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem
As seen in the previous section, the case of East Jerusalem is 
getting more complicated since its occupation in 1967. However, 
tension and violence have reached a boiling point in the summer 
of 2014 following the kidnapping and burning to death of the 
16-year-old Mohammed Abu Khdeir by Israeli settlers. Violent 
clashes erupted, many lives were lost, and hundreds of Palestinian 
men and women, including minors were arrested. As a reaction 
to the provocative visits to Al Aqsa Mosque compound by Jewish 
settlers, hostile clashes between Palestinian youths and Israeli 
soldiers broke out, which many called “the Jerusalem or al-Aqsa 
Intifada”. All the observations analyzed in the previous sections, 
have highlighted the existence of the main continuous constrains 
42 Relatives living outside the “seam zone” will have to obtain a one-
time permit from the Israeli Civil Administration in order to visit them.
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that determine the level of respect of human rights for Palestinians 
in East Jerusalem. Firstly, the implications of the illegal annexation 
of East Jerusalem and some more 64 square kilometers of the 
West Bank to Israel after the War of 1967, and the “Permanent 
Resident” status that was given to the Jerusalemites. This status 
allowed them to work in Israel, enjoy health insurance and social 
welfare benefits provided to all Israelis43, while Jerusalemites are 
obliged to pay different kinds of municipal and governmental fees 
and taxes that, in many cases, are used as tools to coerce them 
to leave the city and emigrate (Abu Zayyad44, November 1, 2016). 
However, the Palestinian Jerusalemites cannot vote or seek election 
to the Knesset; they only can vote or seek election to the Jerusalem 
municipality, which they usually boycott in order not to give 
legitimacy to the Israeli annexation45. Practically, the Israeli policies 
and decisions concerning East Jerusalem have been always taken 
without the involvement or the political influence of its Palestinian 
residents. On the other hand, under Israeli law, East Jerusalem 
Palestinians lose their permanent residency if they leave Jerusalem 
for seven years or more (B’Tselem, 2009), or if they live outside 
the municipal boundaries. In fact, East Jerusalem Palestinians are 
stateless; they hold an Israeli residency permit, and a Jordanian 
travel document, but they are not citizens of either. Any absence 
from the city; studying, work, marriage, as well as holding any other 
citizenship can lead to a withdrawal of the residency status. Since 
1967, about 15,000 Palestinians have lost their residency rights, 
with many more at risk of losing it; this has created a feeling of 
uncertainty, instability and fear.
The second constrain that undermines human rights in East 
Jerusalem is the construction of the Segregation wall that Israel 
had started to build in 2002 to detach Israel and East Jerusalem 
from the West Bank. The Wall follows the 1967 annexation border, 
43 See (B’Tselem, 2006).
44 Ziad Abu Zayyad is an ex-minister for Jerusalem affairs, an ex-leg-
islative Council member of the Palestinian Authority, a lawyer and 
publisher and co-editor of a quarterly Journal of Politics, economics 
and Culture.
45 See ACRI report, 2015.  http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/05/eJ-facts-and-figures-2015.pdf.   
- 26 -
with two major exceptions: the Ma’ale Adumim enclave (not yet 
constructed) which stretches deep into the West Bank, and the 
exclusion of two Palestinian neighborhoods: Kafr A’keb and Shua’fat 
refugee camp (AIC, 2007). The Wall has dual role in the area of 
East Jerusalem: First, it has created another reality for those areas 
which were included within the municipal boundaries when Israel 
has annexed East Jerusalem but then were excluded when the 
course of the Wall was decided. Residents of Shua’fat refugee camp 
and Kafr A’keb have to cross the checkpoint daily on their way to 
Jerusalem for work or school or otherwise, which means children 
became subject to security inspection by Israeli soldiers on their 
way to school on a daily basis, in addition to the waste of time that 
would negatively affect their psychological status. Secondly the 
Wall has completely isolated suburbs considered to be part of the 
West Bank, and has prevented their residents from entering East 
Jerusalem with some exceptions46. Those Jerusalemites, who 
have previously moved to the suburbs due to the severe housing 
crisis, are moving back to the city because crossing the border 
and passing through checkpoint inspection has proven to be too 
disruptive to their daily routine work, over and above their concern 
of the possibility of losing their Israeli “Residency Status”. All this, 
combined with the restrictions on building in East Jerusalem, led to 
an increase in the population density, the rise in housing prices, and 
the growing feelings of discomfort47.
46 The distinct areas were given a different status, according to the 
amount of self-government the Palestinians would have over it 
through the Palestinian Authority, until a final status accord would be 
established.
47 See Un-oCHA, 2009
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HUMAn RIGHTS STAnDARDS In 
eAST JeRUSAleM
In order to view the human rights situation in East Jerusalem, this 
study follows two paths after defining the concept; first it highlights 
the level of respect of human rights in the sovereign state that 
occupies East Jerusalem and controls its Palestinian residents. 
Second, it examines the level of respect for human rights in the 
Palestinian context itself in order to differentiate between what is 
imposed by Israel and what is culturally inherited.
Human rights are generally classified as civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights granted to all citizens of the State. Equal 
rights and liberties should be provided to all citizens regardless 
of their nationality, religion, race or color. First, the State of Israel 
since its foundation is seen as a Jewish democracy, thus excluding 
non-Jewish citizens48. Israel has no constitution, although a 
series of “Basic Laws” enumerate the fundamental rights. Certain 
fundamental laws, orders, and regulations legally depend on the 
existence of a “State of Emergency”, have been in effect since 
194849. Furthermore, Israel has put security on top of its list of 
priorities since its establishment; hence security has always been 
the justification for many human rights violations performed against 
Palestinians in general, in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and those 
of East Jerusalem in particular. Now, mass political killings have 
been perpetrated by many governments such as Turkey, Cambodia, 
Bosnia, and El Salvador. However, states usually repress their crimes 
implications by denial; first by saying the killings did not happen, 
and second by justifying that what had happened was not a crime 
but something else. And finally, by saying that what happened was 
justified for the protection of national security50. All these scenarios 
48 See (Cohen-Almagor, 2009). https://www.researchgate.net/profile/
Raphael_Cohen-Almagor/publication/228194856_Israel_and_Inter-
national_Human_Rights/links/0912f50a7c079ae0b3000000.pdf 
49  See https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160463.pdf   
50 See (Cohen, 1993). Human rights and crimes of the state: the culture 
of denial.
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have been used by Israel starting from the 1948 &1967 wars, the 
first and second Intifada, the wars on the Gaza strip and finally the 
current uprising that is still going till the time being. 
To continue there are several Israeli policies against East Jerusalem 
that constitute grave violations of the human rights of Palestinian 
residents, since its annexation in 1967. The continual Israeli 
governments have set out with all determination to implement the 
Jewish vision of East Jerusalem by the destruction of its geographic 
identity through land confiscation to build Israeli settlements while 
at the same time blocking the Palestinian development. In addition 
to the efforts made to establish a Jewish demographic superiority 
by attracting Jewish immigrants, while denying the Palestinian 
residency rights. Not to mention the keen ongoing practices to 
legitimize the Israeli sovereignty over the city51. International 
and Israeli human rights organizations, who are well known for 
their credibility such as B’Tselem and ACRI, have documented 
the Israeli double standard in providing services among East 
Jerusalem residents. The Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) 
report of May 2015 has particularly listed the Israeli human rights 
violations and the Israeli discrimination policy and neglect against 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem regarding education, health and 
welfare services, and most significantly their already described 
unsecure and conditional residency status. In 2014 the Israeli 
Ministry of Interior revoked the permanent residency status of 107 
Palestinians including 56 women and 12 minors.  According to a 
report released by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Israel is the most impoverished of the 34 
member countries, with a poverty rate of 20.9%52. The (ACRI) report 
of 2015 also highlighted poverty and welfare as a sign of neglect: 
75.4% of all (Palestinian) East Jerusalem residents and 83.9% of 
its children were living below the poverty line in 201353. While by 
contrast, in the same year, only 21.8% of all residents of Israel 
51 See (Hodgkins, 1996). 
52 See http://www.jpost.com/Israel-news/1-in-5-people-living-in-pov-
erty-in-Israel-436770 
53 See :http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-is-the-poorest-
country-in-developed-world-oecd-report-shows.premium-1.524096 
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and 30.8% of the children were living below the poverty line. This 
situation also leaves women more vulnerable to violence as a natural 
result. A society that faces severe economic difficulties will be pulled 
towards violence, and usually women are the first to pay the price. 
The report pointed out that the percentage of Palestinians who are 
receiving welfare services in Jerusalem is 37%, however only 22% 
of the positions of social workers are designated for Palestinians. 
In addition, Israeli authorities failed to conduct adequate planning 
and development in Palestinian neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, 
which has led to a planning crisis. This crisis is manifested in the 
shortage of housing, house demolitions, fines for building without 
a permit, bad infrastructure, ill- planning of public buildings and 
public parks for Palestinians while planning and building in new 
Jewish neighborhoods is well-developed. These violations of 
human rights by the state of Israel are only examples of the overall 
miserable status of human rights in East Jerusalem under the 
sovereign power. Second, a quick glimpse at the status of human 
rights within the Palestinian culture shows that it is similar to other 
Middle East countries, where international human rights standards 
are generally not met.  In the Palestinian context, although the 
1988 PNC54 Declaration of Independence expressed the desire to 
improve the legal status of women, there is no practice of equality 
for women human rights in the Palestinian communities. Both 
customary and Islamic traditions sanction differential treatment on 
the basis of gender. While some sectors of the Palestinian society 
are in favor of women’s human rights, some communities of Islamic 
and traditionalist persuasion oppose such innovation. Therefore, 
two types of human rights discrimination are practiced against 
women in East Jerusalem; one by the Israeli Occupation, and the 
other by their own culture.
The Human Rights Dimensions in East 
Jerusalem: Individual and Collective 
While monitoring human rights in East Jerusalem, it was clear that 
there are two types of violations; one is collective, and applies to 
54 The Palestinian national Council 
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all residents of East Jerusalem; i.e. laws related to the residency 
status, the educational system, restrictions on mobility, among 
others. The second type is specified to certain individuals, groups or 
areas such as home demolishing, family unification and collective 
punishment to a family because one of the family members was 
accused of attempting an act of violence against Israel. This section 
addresses the collective and individual human rights violations in 
East Jerusalem whether the ones related to the Israeli policies or 
those culturally inherited. The “Restricted Development” and the 
“Violence, Arrest and collective Punishment” sections, address the 
Israeli policies that violate human rights, while “Gender Inequality” 
and “Social Fragmentations” sections address the culturally 
inherited violations.  
Restricted Development
Since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel’s primary 
goal has been to create demographic and geographic situations 
that will prevent any future attempt to defy the Israeli sovereignty 
over the city. In order to attain this aim, the successive Israeli 
governments have taken actions to increase the number of Jews 
and reduce the number of Palestinians living in Jerusalem55, where 
such policies have led to a deeply contested and polarized city; 
construction of twelve Jewish neighborhoods within the municipal 
borders between 1968 and 1973, and Jewish communities in the 
metropolitan belt around the city such as the industrial area of 
Mishor Adumim, and the new typology of “suburban” settlement; 
Ma’ale Adumim is an example of these polices. Areas surrounding 
the Old City have become a target by the right-wing groups and the 
Israeli governments in recent years to create Jewish settlements 
such as Al Musrara, Sheikh Jarrah, Mount Scopus, Wadi Al-Joz, 
and Silwan. All this while limiting and restricting the Palestinian 
neighborhoods’ growth to already built-up areas of East Jerusalem. 
These neighborhoods cover the Old City within the walls built by the 
Ottoman Caliph Suleiman the Magnificent and the neighborhoods 
that have developed beyond the old city walls, such as Wadi Al-Joz, 
Shuafat, Beit Hanina, Sheikh Jarrah, Al-Tur, etc. In addition to those 
55  See http://www.btselem.org/topic/jerusalem 
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areas that were not included within the city boundaries when Israel 
annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, are neighborhoods surrounding 
Jerusalem such as Al Ram, Dahiat Al-Barid, Abu Dis, Al-‘Ezariyah 
(Bethany), Kalandia and Shuafat refugee camps, in addition to the 
northwest villages of Jerusalem. The Israeli policies are inclusive 
of all these areas inside the municipal boundaries when governing 
Palestinians living in East Jerusalem; however some problems 
differ from one neighborhood to another. The Old City of Jerusalem, 
especially the Muslim Quarter’s condition, is deteriorating due to the 
lack of preservation and restoration works. The old buildings, the 
roads, and the public services require enormous material and human 
effort in order to ensure adequate use. Hence, the great disparity 
between both the Jewish and Arab sides of the Old City is distinct. 
The reason behind this gap, is that the Israeli authority allocates 
annually almost half a million dollars on restoration works in the 
Jewish Quarter, while less than one third of that sum is allocated to 
the Muslim Quarter in the City. Moreover, there is almost unlimited 
financial support from non-Israeli Jews throughout the world, 
while the Palestinians have to rely on their own limited resources, 
or await financial assistance from the Administration of the Waqf 
and Islamic Affairs who in turn rely on very limited funds. The 
inhabitants’ own earnings hardly provide an acceptable standard of 
living and they receive assistance from the municipality only after a 
long bureaucratic process and many delays56. This has led many of 
the Palestinian Jerusalemites in the old city and also some middle 
class Jerusalemites outside it to relocate to the suburbs, outside 
the municipal boundaries (thus located in the West Bank), such as 
al-‘Eizariyah (Bethany)and Anata, where housing cost is less and 
building permits are easier to obtain57. After the Oslo agreement 
in the 90s, these areas were transferred to the jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), hence, many of the same Jerusalemites 
went back to live inside the municipal boundaries for fear of losing 
their residency status. This reversed displacement was re-enforced 
by the construction of the segregation wall; this, combined with the 
Israeli restrictions on building, led to an increase in the population 
56 See PASIA ,http://www.passia.org/jerusalem/publications/khaled_
khatib_Conservation_Jerusalem/chapter3-1.htm 
57 See (Allegra, 2010).
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density, rising housing prices and growing feelings of discomfort. 
Many were forced to live in crowded inhuman conditions because 
they need to stay in Jerusalem in order not to lose their jobs, business 
or property (UN-OCHA, 2009).The previous waves of displacement 
were mostly enforced by the Israeli governments’ policies. The 
recent mapping study that was carried out by OCHA has shed lights 
on other methods used by the Israeli settler organizations based 
on ownership claims. The claims cover communities inside the Old 
city such as Burj Laqlaq, Burj Al Qirami, Aqbat as Saraya, and Aqbat 
al Khaldiya. Others are in neighborhoods around the old city such as 
Silwan, Ras al ‘Amud and Sheikh Jarrah, in addition to Beit Hanina 
and Beit Safafa. At least 180 Palestinian households in these areas 
have eviction cases filed against them. As a result, 818 Palestinians, 
including 372 children, are at risk of displacement or homelessness58.
The areas that were excluded from the city when the segregation 
wall route was determined like Kafr A’keb and the Shua’fat refugee 
camp are facing different kinds of problems. While these areas are 
de jure under the jurisdiction of the Jerusalem municipality, they 
are deprived of almost all municipal direct services because the 
municipality has decided not to work in the areas outside the Wall. 
Instead, the municipal services are delivered by subcontractors, 
thus without much consideration to quality standards.  This is 
apparent in garbage collection, poor infrastructure, inadequate 
school buildings, health services, streets and sidewalks and above 
all security. Due to the lack of control by the Israeli authorities 
over urban planning in these areas, many contractors invested in 
cheap housing projects with minimum safety qualifications, and 
poor infrastructure. These homes are bought by Jerusalemites who 
seek to maintain their residency rights but cannot afford to live in 
the neighborhoods on the other side of the segregation wall. Most 
of these buildings therefore are already inhabited while they are 
still under construction; this has become an acceptable situation 
in these areas resulting in poor and neglected neighborhoods. 
Moreover, the lack of green spaces and the mere existence of 
various eyesores such as the scattered trash and unpaved side-
streets, give a general sense of chaos. Analyses of the situation 
58 See http://www.ochaoPt.org/content/east-jerusalem-palestin-
ians-risk-eviction 
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would often stigmatize the residents of these areas by assuming 
that chaos is accepted and is part of the Palestinian culture, while 
in reality it’s a natural development in such political and economic 
circumstances. The Israeli policies of neglect and negligence have 
transformed these areas into what they have become today; areas 
suffering from the `neighborhood effect’, which implies that there 
are some behavioral, attitudinal, or psychological features of 
neighborhoods that affect their residents59. Notably the neglect 
and discriminating policies lead to undesirable social effects like 
crime, gang warfare and drug abuse in addition to displacement, 
impoverishment and social fragmentation. Many observers 
believe that this is an intentional policy by the Israeli authorities to 
create a huge gap between Israeli and Palestinian neighborhoods 
as well as to establish and propagate a negative image of the 
Palestinian people locally and worldwide. Others argue that Israel 
excluded these areas for a possible territorial swap with the Ma’ale 
Adumim enclave that is located outside the municipal boundaries 
of Jerusalem in future negotiations with the PNA regarding the 
standpoint on East Jerusalem. The intended exclusion of these 
Palestinian neighborhoods from the city of Jerusalem will serve the 
main and repeatedly stated objective of the Israeli governments 
to reduce the number of Palestinians and increase the number of 
Israelis in Jerusalem.
“I used to live in the old city, the house belonged to my late father, 
but it is small and it needs constant maintenance and renovation 
that cost a lot of money. During the last twenty years, my wife, I 
and our three children had lived in rented apartments in different 
neighborhoods around the old city. We thought it is about time to 
buy our own apartment, and because we cannot afford an apartment 
in the neighborhoods around the old city, we decided to buy in Kafr 
‘Aqab; it is close to Ramallah where I work, and it is encompassed 
within Jerusalem municipality’s borders. Apartments in this area are 
relatively cheap compared to other neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 
with easier payment facilitation. We have been living here for five 
years now, the building is still under construction, no streets or 
sidewalks, but this is not the reason why we decided to move back 
59  See (friedrichs et al, 2003).
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to our late father’s house in the Old City; for although it is old house 
and not as spacious as this one, we are moving back simply because 
I do not have faith in Israel; I am afraid that Kafr ‘Aqab will be handed 
over to the Palestinian Authority and if this happens, it means we 
will lose our residency status and will be kicked out of Jerusalem” 
(Abu Osama, October 1st , 2010).
Most of the Jerusalemites react to the Israeli policies through a 
constant hunt for solutions that, inevitably, disperse their personal 
resources. Many have two homes, one inside the municipality borders 
and another outside of it; the first to maintain their legal presence in 
the city and the other for the purpose of a higher standard of living. 
The problem is that unlike citizenship, the permanent residency 
status is not fixed, and Palestinians have to prove to the Ministry of 
Interior that they are actually living inside the city. They always live in 
fear that one day any of the employees in the Israeli  interior affairs 
office will pay them unexpected visits, whereby it will be discovered 
that they are not residing on permanent basis in Jerusalem, thus 
the city isn’t the center of their life. Accordingly, their permanent 
residency status will be revoked and they will lose the different 
privileges linked to this status. Therefore, some families split up 
and live in both places. While families sprout and children marry, 
there becomes an even greater demand on the limited number of 
houses available in East Jerusalem. Add to the difficulties in getting 
building license, many are driven to build without one, and will live in 
fear that one day the Israeli authorities will demolish their homes. 
302 structures in East Jerusalem were demolished between the 
years 2011-2014; building without a license means that thousands 
of residents living in these houses are obliged to unofficially connect 
to water and sewage, because such houses will not be connected to 
the public water and sewage network according to the Israeli law. 
Thus, such owners are forced to install private pipelines, purchase 
water tanks and operate pumps, and they also have to use cesspools 
in their yard, which ultimately will create an unhealthy environment 
and expose the residents to the risks of infections and disease60.
60 See (ACRI) report, May 2015; east Jerusalem facts and figures 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/eJ-facts-
and-figures-2015.pdf 
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Palestinian communities outside the municipal borders, i.e. ‘Anata, 
Abu-Dis and Al-Eizariyah, also suffer from the Israeli policies that 
constrain their expansion and natural growth on their villages’ 
extended land61; the “demarcation plans” were approved restricting 
their growth to already built-up areas while the administrative 
boundaries of the settlements built on the lands of these villages 
were expanded. Consequently, green and public spaces in these areas 
have shrunk, and the residents of these areas expanded vertically to 
solve their housing crises; hence, the unorganized poorly designed 
high-rise buildings that impair aesthetics are spreading in these 
areas too. They have created together with Shua’fat, Al-Isawiya 
and Kafr ‘Aqab a belt around Jerusalem confronting the Israeli 
settlements’ belt. This makes the comparison between Palestinian 
and Israeli neighborhoods very easy and clear; the areas outside the 
municipal boundaries are subject to isolation by the segregation 
wall, leading to a rise in the rate of unemployment, because many 
of those who used to work in Jerusalem lost their jobs. Hospitals 
and schools that were within walking distance became out of reach 
for them; such circumstances led to the severe deterioration of 
the health. Now, small clinics accessible to inhabitants of the 
neighborhoods beyond the Wall cannot meet the needs of the 
residents. Women in labor and those requiring advanced medical 
care, are obliged to drive to the nearest hospitals in the West Bank, 
either in Jericho at an hour’s drive away, or Ramallah, two hours’ 
drive away. Same problems apply to schooling.
Violence, Arrests and Collective Punishment
As has been shown above, the escalation of violence reached its peak 
in the summer of 2014, and then, again in autumn of 2015. ACRI 
report of May 2015 points out that62 the Israeli forces “have had to 
deal with dangerous and complicated situations in East Jerusalem”. 
Unfortunately, their response has too often been characterized by 
61 Areas (C) of the West Bank where Israel has full control according to 
the oslo agreement.
62 See (ACRI) report, May 2015: east Jerusalem 2015: facts and figures 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/eJ-facts-
and-figures-2015.pdf 
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excessive use of force and violence”. In the past year, 35 Israelis 
have died in violent incidents63, while during the same period, 220 
Palestinians have died in the West Bank including East Jerusalem 
and the Gaza Strip. Only 149 of those who were killed were identified 
by the Israeli authorities as attackers, others were killed during 
clashes and protests64. Israel also used the policy of detention as 
a tool to breakdown riots; according to Addameer report of 2015 
the Israeli forces have arrested more than 800,000 Palestinians 
including 10,000 women since 1967. This number constitutes 
about 40 percent of the total population of the Occupied Territories. 
In 2014, during only the period between July and December, 1,184 
Palestinians were arrested in East Jerusalem alone for offenses 
such as stone throwing, and participating in demonstrations. 
Palestinian women are being exposed to imprisonment just like 
other groups and sectors within the Palestinian society. In 2014, 
the occupying forces arrested 112 Palestinian women and girls, 
signifying an increase of about 70% compared to 2013. The arrested 
females represent various social sectors of the society and age 
groups such as mothers, female journalists, university students, 
and even young girls as young as 14 years old, Malak Al-Khatib who 
was sentenced to two months in prison and a six thousand shekel 
fine. University student Lina Khateeb was accused of participating 
in a march and throwing stones; she was sentenced to six months 
in prison65. In fact, one-third of the arrested during the last uprising 
were under the age of eighteen. These children were subjected to 
interrogation without parental presence, and judicial action was 
taken against them. Many of those arrested children had reported 
physical violence used against them by the police on their way to 
interrogation and while being interrogated, as well as being exposed 
to threats, terrorization, handcuffing, blindfolding for long hours, 
denial of food and water, in addition to prohibiting them from taking 
toilet breaks.
63 In addition to two  Americans in separate attacks
64 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/israel-palestinian-hamas_
us_57fa872ee4b0b6a430332b04 
65 See http://www.addameer.org/sites/default/files/publications/viola-
tions_report_2014.pdf 
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“I am a physician. Few years ago I thought of establishing an 
organization with experts to offer psychological counseling because 
I believe that many health problems are caused by tension and 
stress, especially for female patients and children who suffer from 
social problems. Most of our clients are mothers of children and 
teenagers who were recently released out of Israeli jails suffering 
from trauma. We give special attention to those children, as usually 
less attention is given to them by their own families or friends in our 
area (Jerusalem suburbs inside the Wall), such as my home town 
Abu-Dis. It is very important to help the mother release negative 
emotions and to teach her some tactics to overcome tension and 
anxiety, not only for her own benefit but also for the entire family, 
as she is responsible also for other young members of the family. 
During this Intifada the number of those suffering from both social 
and political stress has been escalating” (Abdulla Abu-Hilal66, 
October 20, 2016). 
The occupation forces have arrested Palestinian children 
systematically and have subjected them to different types of 
psychological and physical torture, including recruiting them to 
work as informants and extorting their families financially by forcing 
them to pay enormous financial fines to secure their release. This 
had a destructive impact on the children’s mental health, and led 
in most cases to drop-outs from schools after their release. The 
family of Ahmad Manasrah, 14 years old, who was sentenced on 
the 7th of November to serve a 12-year sentence in Israeli prisons, 
is obligated to pay a fine of 180,000 NIS ($47,200 USD)67. In other 
cases, in addition to the financial overheads, the Israeli punishment 
gets to the prisoner’s family to set an example for other Palestinian 
families:
“My son Abdel-Nasser was only 14 when he was arrested last year; 
it was three o’clock in the morning, we were asleep. Since then I 
wake up terrified every night at the exact time. He is just a kid; his 
imprisonment had turned our life to hell. Forget about the money we 
66 Dr. Abdulla Abu-Hilal is the chairman of the Board of Al Marfa Associ-
ation for Mental Health located in Al-‘eizariyah.
67 See http://samidoun.net/2016/11/palestinian-child-ahmad-manas-
rah-14-sentenced-to-12-years-in-israeli-prison/ 
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are paying to the lawyer and other expenses. Looking at his empty 
bed is a daily torture, visiting him is another type of torture: you 
lose the whole day through transportations, inspection, meeting 
him and coming back heart broken. The Israeli authorities were 
punishing us even before my child was convicted with whatever they 
are accusing him of. I am a Jerusalemite with Blue ID “Residency 
Status”, while my husband holds a West Bank identity card “Green 
ID”.  We were married almost 25 years ago, and we have applied 
for family unification in order for my husband to have a residency 
status like me and our children, but, after years he was only offered a 
stay permit and till today he didn’t get the “Residency Status”. After 
the imprisonment of our son, the Israeli authorities have revoked 
his stay permit; my husband cannot live with us in our home in 
Jerusalem anymore” (Om Abdel-Nasser68, October 24, 2016).
Detention operations are usually carried out by a large number of 
Israeli soldiers in the middle of the night, terrorizing the family and 
destroying the contents of the house, under the pretext of search 
and inspection69. Palestinian residents of the West Bank who are 
married to residents of East Jerusalem have encountered hardships 
and complex difficulties due to amendments that were introduced 
to the Law of Citizenship and Entry into Israel starting from 2003. 
These amendments were designed to freeze family unification 
processes in order to prevent residents of the West Bank from 
obtaining the residency status. The previous testimony reflects a 
severe violation of the basic family rights; cancelling the father’s 
stay permit and expelling him to the West Bank just because his son 
was accused of committing a “terrorist activity” is one of the Israeli 
forms of collective punishment. Article 4 of the “8 Articles Plan” 
that was released by the state of Israel in November 2014 serves 
to subjugate and collectively punish Palestinian Jerusalemites. It 
had classified throwing stones and Molotov Cocktails at the Israeli 
police or army as “terrorist activity” and those who are accused of 
committing this act have to be arrested and to be automatically 
68 om Abdel-nasser is a Jerusalemite married to a West Bank ID holder 
man and teaches at the University 
69 See http://www.addameer.org/sites/default/files/publications/viola-
tions_report_2014.pdf 
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deprived of their social security rights, including the national 
insurance allocations, in addition to other enforcement measures 
against their families. The Israeli Police has provided the names of 
hundreds of suspects and their family members to the Jerusalem 
municipality and other authorities, in order to increase enforcement 
measures against them70. Other methods of collective punishment 
were also used during this youth uprising such as demolishing and 
sealing the houses of “terrorists” in both East Jerusalem and the 
West Bank71.
The PNA explained the reasons behind the ‘third Intifada’ as a 
reaction to the desperation after the collapse of the peace talks in 
2014, and the expansion of Israeli settlements on occupied land. 
However, the match that exploded the powder keg was the burning 
to death of Mohammad Abu Khdeir by a group of settlers and the 
provocative visits of the religious settlers to Al-Aqsa Mosque while 
banning many Palestinians (Morabitteen)- the worshipers whose 
presence in al-Aqsa mosque play the role of unofficial guards72 - 
from entering the Mosque. This has given the act of struggle a 
strong religious motive. The Occupied Territories have witnessed an 
increase in Islamic practices during the late 70s like most countries 
in the Middle East73. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was 
formed in Jerusalem in 1946, but faced a formidable obstacle in the 
popular Palestinian support for nationalist and leftist positions in 
the West Bank. The increase of the Brotherhood’s followers among 
Palestinians was substantially aided by the growth of the Islamic 
movements in the Middle East region as a whole, particularly 
after the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979”74. The 
trends continued to escalate during and after the first Intifada in 
which the offshoot of the Muslim Brothers movement (Hamas) 
was created. The victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Parliament 
70 Ibid
71 See ACRI report, 2015.  http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/05/eJ-facts-and-figures-2015.pdf     
72 Morabitteen is the plural of Al- Ribat, which is an Islamic expression 
generally means protect and guard an Islamic land or property such 
as holy places.
73 See (Shahid , 1988). 
74  Ibid)
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elections in 2006 reflects not only the changed political affiliation of 
the Palestinians but also the religious and social behavior. Islamic 
teachings influenced the Palestinians’ social behavior; reaction 
to events like Israeli forces shooting demonstrators or arresting 
them are, in addition to an act of resilience in the face of the Israeli 
occupier, “God’s will” that will revenge and compensate their pain 
and reward them by a good place in heaven after life. This general 
reaction of helpless parents is related to their religious beliefs that 
it was God´s will and that accepting destiny is part of their faith. 
However, it is not always the case, because such acts increase rage, 
especially among the younger generation who became motivated 
to provoke the occupier; few attempted to commit violent attacks 
against Israelis, many others participated in riots while knowing 
that they will most likely be arrested or even killed. 
“We reject the Israeli story about our son Bahaa; we lost him on 
Oct. 13, 2015, he was killed. The Israelis said that he and his friend 
Bilal boarded a bus in Jerusalem and attacked passengers with a 
gun and a knife, killing 3 Israelis and wounding 4 others. They say 
that Bahaa was shot and killed by a security guard while Bilal was 
arrested. We do not know exactly what happened and I doubt this 
story because Israel has concealed many facts. They did not publish 
any video or a police investigation, not even a newspaper report. We 
believe that Bahaa was extra judicially executed by Israeli police for 
an alleged involvement in the October 13 stabbing attack in a bus 
in Armon HaNatziv75. And even if he did what the Israeli Authorities 
are claiming, it would be out of anger and a reaction to the ongoing 
persecution, and the daily Israeli inhuman practices against us 
Palestinians. He witnessed the humiliation, unjust actions such as 
blocking the neighborhood and preventing children from going to 
school; he himself stood by our neighbors when the Israelis came 
to demolish their home, he helped them all night long to get out 
their belongings because the Israeli bulldozers would not wait. He 
witnessed the pain, the frustration and was like all of us helpless. 
People tell me “congratulations, your son is a martyr and he is now 
75 Armon Hanatziv is a Jewish-only settlement built on land confiscated 
from Jabal al-Mukabir, Baha’s  our neighborhood,  in occupied east 
Jerusalem.
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in heaven”, but I say no welcome to death, we love life and Bahaa 
should have had the right to a bright future. Hussam, my other son 
who is a social worker, was arrested after his brother’s killing. He 
was detained for six days and then was put on house arrest while 
no charges were brought against him. Then they threatened us with 
a punitive home demolition and they did demolish the house. They 
held Bahaa’s body in their refrigerators throughout the whole year 
and forbade us from giving him a respectful funeral while Israeli 
law does not penalize the families of those settlers who killed Abu 
Khdair or Dawabsheh for example. These collective punishments did 
not and will not scare us, rather, they will make us more determined 
to resist, stick to our land, and plant hope (Muhammad Alayan76, 
November 15, 2016). 
Figure 4 “Muhammad Alayan in his demolished house”; source: Facebook 
page (نايلع دممح) 
“How a scout leader became a martyr”, this question was raised 
in an article title by Budour Youssef Hassan on “The Electronic 
Intifada”77. She wrote on 22 October 2015:
“The nagging question for anyone who knew Bahaa Alayan or read 
about him was: what led him to risk his life and go on a mission 
that would likely end in his execution, if we are to believe the Israeli 
76 Muhammad Alayan is the father of Bahaa, he is a lawyer and author 
from Jabal al-Mukabir/ east Jerusalem.
77 https://electronicintifada.net/people/electronic-intifada 
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assertion that he was one of the assailants? Conventional wisdom 
says that freedom fighters risk their lives because they have nothing 
to lose and that they are compelled by despair. But Bahaa had a lot 
to lose; he had a loving family. He ran a press which printed covers of 
books and magazines, postcards and posters that Alayan designed 
himself. He was a founder of the Local Youth Initiative in Jabal 
al-Mukabir, a group that sought to offer local children and young 
adults a free space to express themselves. He was an avid reader 
who helped establish the first public library in the neighborhood. He 
was the leader of the Jabal al-Mukabir Boy Scout troop and trained 
guides in the neighborhood’s girl scouts troop as well” (Budour 
Youssef Hassan on “The Electronic Intifada” Jerusalem, 22 October 
2015).
Jabal al-Mukabir is one of the poorest neighborhoods in the 
Jerusalem area. In addition to the settlements built on its land, the 
construction of the segregation wall has also led to massive land 
confiscation, isolating the neighborhood from the rest of Jerusalem. 
Gender Inequality
This section covers human rights violations inherited in the 
culture regarding: Education, Social Control, Inheritance Rights, 
Early Marriage and Domestic Violence. Some of these aspects are 
culturally inherited and imposed by Israel at the same time such as 
education, while others are only related to norms that are deeply 
rooted in the Arab culture such as the socioeconomic system that 
is influenced by traditions and Islamic teachings. Other social 
problems, such as domestic violence is a universal problem that is 
happening in all countries, cross cultures and among people from 
all levels of education. 
Education
The two dimensions of human rights violations described above are 
clear when we analyze education in East Jerusalem. The education 
system in East Jerusalem is divided into public schools maintained 
by the West Jerusalem municipality and the non-municipal 
schools. The municipal schools teach a different “Arab educational 
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curriculum”, while the non-municipal schools are owned and run 
by either church, the Waqf78  in coordination with the PA, UNRWA79 
or private bodies that continue to use the Jordanian curriculum 
after the Israeli occupation of the city in 1967. Since the Oslo 
Accords of 1993, these schools of East Jerusalem have used the 
Palestinian curriculum. In September 2011, the Palestinian Public 
schools were ordered to limit themselves to the Israeli text books 
and to only purchase them from the municipality, these forced text 
books did not carry the logo of the PNA Education Ministry and the 
contents were censored. Any reference to the Palestinian identity, 
culture and heritage was erased, and all the expressions regarding 
the Palestinian history and contemporary narrative were removed. 
Many have opposed this move and called for protests and strikes 
against the distortion of the Palestinian curriculum. However, some 
schools eventually abided by the Israeli instructions out of fear of 
losing funding.80 This is a great concern for the next generation of 
Palestinian Jerusalemites; they are worried that this will affect the 
level of nationalism and might promote what Israel is hoping for, i.e. 
the Palestinian Identity and narrative will vanish with the demise 
of the old generation and that it will be forgotten by the coming 
younger generations. In addition to discrimination in service 
distribution; according to the (ACRI) report of May 2015, only 41% 
of Jerusalemites students are enrolled in the official municipal 
education system, due to the shortage of the number of classrooms, 
although the Palestinian students constitute 40% of all students 
in both East and West Jerusalem. Even though education for both 
genders became one of the key Palestinian social values after losing 
the land by war and occupation, gender inequality in education is 
one of the Palestinian society’s characteristics. Primary education 
78 Waqf means a mortmain property is, under the context of chari-
ty «sadaqah», an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, 
typically donating a building or plot of land or even cash for Muslim 
religious or charitable purposes with no intention of reclaiming the 
assets.
79 The United nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UnRWA), was created in 1949 to provide education, health care and 
social services to the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 
wars in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and elsewhere.
80 See PASSIA Publication ( Arab east Jerusalem – A Reader, 2013: 203)
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is nearly universal in most [MENA]81 countries and the gap between 
boys’ and girls’ enrolments in secondary schools has disappeared. 
However, the gap in Palestine is in favor of females (Glick & Sahn, 
2000). One of the reasons is the phenomenon of boys dropping 
out of school to work in Israel, especially before the first Intifada in 
1987. Later, during the first, second, Intifada and the current unrest 
situation, most school boys were at the heart of the dynamics, 
and many of them were jailed by Israel for periods ranging from 
several months to several years and most of them did not go back 
to school when released; for these two reasons, among others, 
female students out-numbered their male counterparts in school 
enrolment except in private schools. Nevertheless, Palestinian 
parents generally have been and are more willing to invest in the 
education of their sons, rather than in their daughters.
Figure 5: Source: PCBS (2014).
“I was a top student in my class. I was sent to the UNRWA school 
while my brother was sent to a private school; there, he was able 
to study English and French from kindergarten until high school. 
I did not feel angry because the general belief is that sons are a 
greater asset to the family. A good education will lead to better job 
opportunities for them and they can help the family financially, while 
daughters will get married and even if they work, their money will 
81 [MenA] is the abbreviation of Middle east and north Africa. The West 
Bank and Gaza Strip were included in the study
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contribute to their husbands after marriage.” (Rasha82, November 
29, 2016). 
One of the justifications, as mentioned by the interviewee, is the 
male financial obligations towards his family that do not apply to 
women or girls. What is remarkable is that females were and still are 
more committed to education; girls are more likely to progress on 
to university while boys will most likely drop out of schools to work 
in Israel.
Social Control
The margin of social freedom for girls is limited to education and 
certain types of jobs later, mainly in education and the health 
sectors and other administrative jobs. 
“I am almost fifty years old; my sister is a little bit younger than me. 
We both did not marry and we work since we graduated from the 
university, but we still live with our parents. We even need permission 
if we want to go out for dinner with some friends and stay a little bit 
late at night. Sometimes I feel I do not have no right to control my 
own life” (Samar Bader83, September 24, 2016). 
The Palestinian male, in general, accepts that the females under 
his authority (daughters, sisters) will leave the home for study and 
work. He can see the benefits of education which generally lead to 
greater financial contributions on their part, to the family’s income 
if they pay, and if they don’t, they at least take care of their own 
needs, thereby help to alleviate the financial burden of the father or 
the brother. However, in all cases, a male stays in control over their 
social life, and in general, women who are financially independent 
and are still single, cannot live in their own apartment. There is 
also no freedom for relationships with males outside the marriage 
either; all this is under the pretext of maintaining the family honor84.
82 Rasha is a mother of two who was married at the age of 18, without 
any consideration to her excellent educational attainment.
83 Samar Bader is a Jerusalemite who works at the library of al-Quds 
University.
84 The situation in cities like Ramallah and Bethlehem is different as 
girls have more social freedom. This social freedom for females is 
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Inheritance Rights and Early Marriage
Most families in the Palestinian society also violate women’s 
inheritance rights. According to the Islamic Shari’a law85, a female 
gets half the share that her brother gets from her deceased 
parents’ inheritance. Although Islamic law is not based on equal 
rights for both sexes, and most of the people is Muslim, they do not 
even follow the Islamic Shari’a law; a consolation amount of money, 
which is generally less even than their stipulated right according 
to the Islamic Shari’a law, will be paid to the female instead. This 
is under the pretext of keeping the family fortune within the family. 
Hammami (1993) explained the origin of this generalized social 
compromise on this issue stating that farmer women traded their 
legal share of the amount of land they inherited for the promise 
from their brothers to support them economically and socially,  This 
tradition is very much embedded even in the mind of many women 
until today; Mrs. Halima who is a mother of six girls and a sister 
of wealthy brothers said: “I forgive my brothers, I do not want my 
share from my late father’s property, and I only ask them to keep 
the good relations with me and my family, such as visiting me and 
my married daughters in times of feasts to show off in front of their 
husbands that they have a big wealthy family” (Mrs. Halima, October 
24, 2016)86. 
“We are three sisters, we have no brothers. Two of us were married 
but only one has children. We realized lately that according to the 
Islamic Shari’a law, our nephews have no right to inherit from me or 
my sister because they are not considered paternal blood relatives, 
but if we had a brother he would have had the right to inherit from 
us. Therefore, my sister may get only the third and the rest goes to 
the closest male relative from my father´s side. Our nephews, who 
are the closest to us, cannot inherit from their aunts!!!!  Now we 
less in rural areas; it depends on how far the village is from the city 
center and the geographical location of the city (the north and south 
of the West Bank are more conservative than the center).
85 The Islamic law “Shari›a” is based on the ottoman law of family 
Rights of 1917and is part of the Palestinian legal system.
86 This interview was conducted by the researcher three years ago for 
another research about the Palestinian women’s’ rights.
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are digging for a solution for this problem (Jumana87, November 17, 
2016).
One of the justifications for this is that it is only males who carry the 
financial obligations and responsibilities of the family (Welchman, 
2003) and it is not a matter of gender discrimination, because the 
parents of a dead son or daughter inherit the same according to 
the Islamic Shari’a law. However, not everyone follows this law and 
they try to escape it and find legal solutions despite the fact that 
they might be accused of manipulation and many will question their 
faith.  Generally, women accept this religious and social norm, even 
if they do not fully agree with it, just to avoid the argument and they 
find an alternative to better and more independent socio-economic 
life by education and work. Many young girls go with the flow and 
agree to be traditionally married at an early age and they move from 
being under the authority of their father/brother to the one under 
their husbands. It is common to see both cases in the Palestinian 
society; those who finished their high school and continued into 
higher education and are working, and those who were married 
around the age of seventeen and start a family at a young age. The 
latter is more likely to occur in what used to be rural-areas around 
the city (villages of East Jerusalem) such as Silwan, At-Tur, Abu Dis 
and Isawiya,.etc.
“I started working at al-Isawiya municipal girls’ school sixteen 
years ago; the locals did not appreciate much girls’ education in 
the past; many girls were engaged after the ninth grade because 
their families would not allow them to pursue their education in 
the city, East Jerusalem high schools (maximum fifteen minutes’ 
drive). Now more girls are studying in the city, and starting from 
next year the Jerusalem municipality will establish a high school 
for girls in al-Isawiya. Our role, in addition to education, is to help 
in respecting certain values such as the girls right in being raised 
in a healthy environment. Therefore,  our concern is to protect our 
students not only while they are at the school;  if we notice any 
sings of domestic violence, we investigate and we talk first with the 
87 Jumana is rich Jerusalemites who did not marry and have no chil-
dren.
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parents to solve the problem, and we  inform the social services 
if there were no positive response from the family” ( Afaf Shihabi 
Qaddoumi88, August 16, 2016).
The previous testimony highlights several important issues and 
points out that people in what used to be rural areas around 
Jerusalem, al-fellaheen (the countryside people), are more 
conservative when it comes to women rights such as the right to 
education and work.
Domestic Violence
The testimony in the previous section indirectly highlighted the 
problem of domestic violence. It is common knowledge that it 
is a social problem that is prevailing in all countries and cultures 
and among people of all levels of educational and socioeconomic 
statuses and religions. Arab Women in general, and fellaheen 
(countryside) women in particular, are opposed to seek or accept 
external intervention in cases of domestic violence, as indicated by 
the relatively low rate of incidents reported to the police or social 
services. The Israeli law for Prevention of Family Violence of 1991 
intended to provide legal support to all victims regardless of their 
ethnic, religious or national background. However, the Palestinians 
of East Jerusalem generally don’t seek these services as their 
enactment requires direct involvement in the family life and it harms 
the privacy of the family. In addition, most Arab communities in 
Israel perceive this law as a punishing measure against males, and 
not as protective or preventive measure for females89. In addition 
to the fact that the social services department is an Israeli office, 
meaning that Jerusalemites in general accept vital services from 
the Israeli occupier such as national security, health insurance and 
education but they avoid dealing with the social services department 
because they consider this as an act of “normalization with the 
occupier” or even betraying the Palestinian cause. The social 
services department replaced most of the Jewish workers dealing 
88 Afaf Shihabi Qaddoumi is the headmistress of al-Isawiya municipal 
girls’ elementary school.
89 See (Haj-Yahia, 2000) “Wife abuse and battering in the sociocultural 
context of Arab society”.
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with East Jerusalem Palestinians with Palestinian Jerusalemites or 
Palestinians with an Israeli passport to overcome the nationality, 
language and culture barriers:
“Isawiya became very crowded; the houses are so close to each 
other, no privacy, sometimes a family of six lives in an apartment of 
only a two rooms. In such circumstances, and with lack of a parental 
supervision, sexual harassment incidents by family members or 
neighbors are most likely to happen to the young girls. Therefore, 
we have classes to discuss sensitive issues like this; usually the girl 
will come afterwards to confess to the teacher and to ask for help. 
I prefer to talk to the parents first and if they do not cooperate I 
inform the social services who have the power to arrest and punish. 
(Afaf Shihabi Qaddoumi, August 16, 2016).
Domestic and sexual violence are still sensitive issues. There are 
other barriers in reporting sexual harassment or assault cases in 
particular; such as being afraid of “blaming the victim” issue, or 
protecting the family’s reputation. 
Social Fragmentation and Social Problems
This section focuses on the social fragmentation caused by 
displacement, in addition to the different legal statuses that 
affect the social relation map, and the dispersion of drugs, which 
is considered to be the main social problem among others in East 
Jerusalem. All these factors affect the status of human rights of the 
Jerusalemites in general and of the vulnerable groups in particular. 
The local-Stranger Relationship
The previous interview highlighted that Al-Isawiya is densely 
populated because of its relatively cheap rental prices that attract 
those who are looking for cheap housing inside the municipal 
boundaries of Jerusalem. The residents who are not original locals 
of this and other neighborhoods are relatively “poor” with many 
children. This has increased the dispersion of many social problems 
in addition to the fact that the new comers compete with the locals 
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over the limited resources such as the municipal school seats that 
are almost free of fees. Locals of al-Isawiya, as most Palestinians, 
are generally warm and welcoming to those who come to settle 
down in the town but they believe they should have the priority 
when it comes to the use of limited resources. This has created 
another type of social reality and social fragmentation that could 
be called “the local-stranger relationship”. The explanation of this 
phenomenon is that the Palestinian society has a clan-like familial 
structure, meaning that each member of the community can be 
traced to one of the community clans. Therefore, anyone who is not 
a local will be clearly identified and labeled as a stranger. The word 
“ghareeb”, which means stranger, is rooted in the Palestinian social 
structure and it has a territorial significance. A person is generally 
defined not only by his family-clan name but also with the place of 
origin. Hence, anyone who is not from the locals, even if this person 
is from the second or third generation and was born in this locality 
is defined as a “stranger”. Many of old parents still use the term 
‘stranger’ to refer to their daughter’s groom if he is from another 
Palestinian town or even from a different clan of their own town. 
This reality is seen in many other neighborhoods such as al’Eizariyah 
and Isawiya, while others such as al-Sawahra traditionally do not 
sell land to a ‘stranger’, therefore they managed to keep their own 
town traditional characteristics alive till the time being. However, 
the Palestinian society also has a degree of sensibility regarding 
displacement because of the 1948 Exodus (al-Nakba)90. Many fled 
to neighboring Arab countries, however, some 380,000 fled to the 
West Bank including East Jerusalem. They can be divided mainly in 
two categories; those who were displaced in refugee camps created 
by the United Nations (some 100,000) and the rest are those who 
settled down in cities and villages (Bisharat, 1997). Both categories 
were labeled by the locals as ‘strangers’. This label is still applicable 
90 Al-nakba is the Arabic word for catastrophe 
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also to their second and third generations all of whom were born in 
East Jerusalem or the West Bank. Mr. Abu Omar shared his feelings:
“In the al-Salama / Jaffa sub-district (before 1948) we used to have 
an elementary and a secondary school, while Jerusalem suburbs 
had a primitive school system called “al-kuttab91”.  During the 1948 
war my family, along with many fled to the district of Jerusalem. I 
married one of the local young women and I became the respected, 
well-known Arabic language teacher in the boys’ school.  However, 
when I was promoted to the position of headmaster, there were 
voices amongst the locals that the headmaster should be one 
of them, and not a ‘stranger’. We are all Palestinians, we were 
displaced from the north to the center, and after all these years we 
are still considered strangers in the eyes of the locals (Abu Omar, 
August 16, 2016).
The territorial emphasis in Shua’fat refugee camp, for example 
is well illustrated in the everyday language and gives the place of 
origin great importance in grounding the refugees’ identity, which 
embodies their history, memories and their slight differences in 
culture92.The term “stranger” here represents a two-sided problem; 
the refugee’s lack of feeling of belonging is not only because the 
locals of the surrounding areas always express superiority over 
them, but also because the refugees themselves do not want to lose 
their original identity of historic Palestine that they already lost in 
1948. This feeling of pride is driven by the Palestinian nationalism 
in order to keep the Palestinian question alive; the new generations 
should not forget; the grandfather will transfer the feeling as 
“ghareeb” to his son who will do the same with his children. Now, 
and although the refugees lost hope of a just political solution 
to their displacement, the everyday practices kept the feeling of 
being a “stranger” alive. This had a great overall impact on the 
homogeneity of the Palestinian society not only in East Jerusalem 
but also in the West Bank where “the refugee” communities 
comprise approximately 42 % of the total population93.
91 Al-kuttab is a teaching class held usually in the mosques for mainly 
Qura’an and Arabic language. 
92 See (Yiftachel, 2002).
93  See  (Bisharat, 1997).
- 52 -
The Change in the Social Relation Map
More social fragmentation was further implemented by the different 
civil status that was given to the residents of East Jerusalem and its 
surroundings; the Blue ID and the Green ID. Until the Wall was built, 
there was a residential continuum between East Jerusalem and its 
West Bank suburbs. The distinction between the neighborhoods 
that were -in or out- of East Jerusalem was purely artificial; the 
social fabric did not correspond to this distinction. Often, members 
of the same family have different civil statuses; these differences 
influence the entitlement for services and benefits but they did not 
split the families themselves (Amir, 2011). The Green ID holders 
were formally forbidden from entering Israel and East Jerusalem 
years before the construction of the Wall but it was not enforced as 
a general rule. The Wall in its early stages was just an obstacle that 
held back the flow of people. People managed to find ways to get 
through like the open areas where the construction had not begun 
yet, or by squeezing themselves through its openings, or simply by 
jumping over to the other side using big stones and other objects 
as ladders. In 2009 almost all of these passages were closed and 
the Wall became the means for implementing the rule. Entrance to 
East Jerusalem became restricted to six entry-points (checkpoints) 
(Ibid). These entries are only for those who hold the Blue ID or the 
Green ID with a permit94. Many of the suburbs’ families had strong 
social ties with families living within East Jerusalem, mainly by 
intermarriage. After the Wall, it became difficult for relatives to meet 
and support each other in times of celebration and commiseration. 
Mrs. Om Hasan is a Jerusalemite who settled in al-‘Eizariyah, before 
the 1967 war with her immediate family. Accordingly, they were 
given green West Bank IDs. Mrs. Om Hasan complained:
“Yesterday we had visitors, a mother and her son who is a potential 
groom. They left with no explanation when we told them that we 
hold Green IDs. They were looking for a bride who can join the son 
and live with him in Jerusalem, I cannot blame them” (Om Hasan, 
November 25, 2016).
Many studies expected that people’s mobility along and across the 
94  See (Amir, 2011).
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Wall would lead to certain difficulties in the short run, and would 
change the demographic structure of the Palestinian communities 
in the medium and long term (PCBS, 2004). Jamila, a mother of a 
32-year-old son shared her story:
“I suggested a beautiful, educated young girl to be the future bride 
for my son. He said:  I know her and I like her but she holds a different 
ID than mine. She lives in Jerusalem with a Blue ID while I hold a 
Green ID and we live in al- ‘Eizariyah, which means West Bank. I’ve 
seen how much my friends have suffered in such a situation. It is 
not only about the difficulties of visiting and socializing; it extends 
to the type of IDs their children will receive. This will split the family 
apart eventually and I don’t think it’s wise that we should go through 
this, look around mom!!!!!!” (Samira95, October 1st, 2016).
Indeed, the trend of marriage during the past ten years has changed. 
The exclusion from and inclusion in East Jerusalem has resulted 
in a different social relationship map being drawn, and the social 
structure has changed. People tend to marry someone with the 
same ID type to avoid the social difficulties they would encounter. 
“Today I received the ’Permanent Israeli Residency Status’ after 
seventeen years of being married to a Jerusalemite. 17 years of fear, 
of temporary stay permits and of complicated renewal procedures. 
I asked with anxiety: Are my kids included? Are their names written 
in the document? May they travel with me? May they stay with me 
wherever I will be? The lady said: yes, it’s written there. I felt like I 
possessed the whole world, I cried for a long time, as long as the 17 
years of suffering and discrimination in all areas of life. Today I am 
officially the mother of my children; I can be with them in any place, 
without threat or fear. I wish it for every woman in East Jerusalem 
who is going through the same situation; I pray for every mother 
and every father to reunite with their families” (Rudaina Damous 
Kaloti96, September 29th, 2016/ Facebook Post).
95 Samira is a mother of a 34 year old son, 
96 Rudaina Damous Kaloti is from al-‘eizariyah , she is a mother of one 
son and two daughters, this post was on her page of facebook, she 
gave the permission  for her statement to be published here. 
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Palestinian residents of the West Bank, who are married to residents 
of East Jerusalem, also live in Jerusalem, as well as children with 
one parent who is a resident of the West Bank. For more than a 
decade, these families have encountered hardships and complex 
difficulties resulting from the lack of regulation of their status, due 
to amendments introduced to the Law of Citizenship and Entry into 
Israel since 2003. These amendments, that were designed to freeze 
family unification processes in Israel and to prevent residents of the 
West Bank from obtaining residency status, are severe violations of 
numerous basic rights97. 
The Diffusion of Drugs
The negative consequences of the Israeli policies of isolation, 
neglect, and restriction on free movement have additional effects on 
vulnerable groups especially mothers. The negative impact impedes 
her from reaching her children and the whole family, increasing 
their risk of suffering from social exclusion, instability and a general 
increase of poverty level that eventually generates numerous 
social problems, such as addiction. Many believe that one of the 
Israeli policies is to subvert the minds of young Palestinians and 
to create such social problems in order to weaken the Palestinian 
communities. Palestine has no historic connection with the drugs 
trade. Its arrival has been sudden and enormous. Al Quds University 
estimates there are over 6,000 addicts in East Jerusalem today, 
compared with 300 in 198698. The journalist Sawsan Ramahi wrote 
on the Middle East Monitor on 3rd of January 2011:
Prior to 1967, the number of people known to use drugs was listed in 
dozens; at that time, the West Bank [including East Jerusalem] was 
under Jordanian control and statistics available from the Global 
Report on Drugs showed no narcotics production or trafficking. 
...The situation changed after the Six Day war [1967 war]. The 
Occupied Territories became fertile ground for smuggling and use of 
all types of illegal substances. … The occupation authorities appear 
97 See ACRI report, 2015.  http://www.acri.org.il/en/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/05/eJ-facts-and-figures-2015.pdf.   
98 Al-Jazeera report on drugs of 6 JUlY 2011, see http://www.aljazeera.
com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162874544676539.html 
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to condone the drug-smuggling networks in East Jerusalem where 
no serious attempts have been made to raid dealers’ and addicts’ 
“nests”, even though some are well-known and only 50 meters or so 
from police stations or other Israeli occupation institutions… There 
is a feeling locally that the police know very well what is happening 
but is “comfortable” with the situation as long as the victims are the 
Palestinians. It has been observed that a known drug dealer is left 
free to peddle his poisonous wares in East Jerusalem, but as soon 
as he tries to do the same in Israeli West Jerusalem he is picked up 
by anti-drug units of the local police” (Sawsan Ramahi,99 January 
3, 2011).
Unfortunately, the spread of drugs including storage, distribution 
and use has spread in East Jerusalem, most prominently in parts 
of the Old City and the areas around, such as al-Mesrara, al-
Thawri, al-Tor and Beit Hanina, in addition to the suburbs outside 
the segregation wall such as al-Ram, Abu Dis and al- ‘Eizariyah, 
Anata and the Shuafat camp, which is recognized as the center for 
all types of drugs. In Al Ram, which is constrained up against the 
Segregation wall, degradation is the main symptom; since 2006 Al 
Ram has been locked out of Jerusalem by the Wall from three sides. 
The effect of this sudden disconnection has been overwhelming; 
33 % of all businesses were closed, 75 % of youth under the age 
of 24 became unemployed, and almost half of the town’s 62,000 
residents have been denied access to Jerusalem.
“My husband is a drug addict and maybe a dealer too. We have five 
children, I do not work and he is the only one providing for our everyday 
needs. He used to work as a mechanic in Jerusalem, he lost his job 
after the Wall and I do not know from where he gets some money. 
The problem is that he is very violent with me and the children, I 
am afraid that my 13 years old son will follow his father’s steps. It 
became common to hear the word “Hashish” all around as if it is just 
cigarettes. There is no authority, no security and no police, how am I 
going to protect my children? ” (Ameena100, October 24, 2016).
99 See  https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/middle-
east/1907-the-scourge-of-drugs-in-jerusalem 
100 Ameena is a 36 years mother who is unemployed with five children 
lives in al-‘eizariyah (Bethany)
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Al Ram, like Abu Dis and Al-‘Ezariyah, has been left in midpoint 
because of the Oslo agreement of 1993. These areas were classified 
as a mixture of Area B and C, which requires Israeli security control 
with some Palestinian Authority administration101. This means 
that the towns’ inhabitants are without National Security Forces 
as the Palestinian police are forbidden from functioning in these 
areas without the Israeli permission, hence, the residents live in 
anarchy102. These areas became a perfect place for outlaws.
Palestinians in each neighborhood of East Jerusalem are busy with 
problems in their everyday lives that vary according to different 
conditions, different legal status and different Israeli policies 
towards them and this sets them apart even more. The role of the 
the civil society organizations is crucial in such circumstances. 
101 The Palestinian police located in Area A where the Palestinian Author-
ity has full civil and security control cannot interfere in Area B before 
getting the approval of the Joint Security Coordination office (Israel). 
This usually takes up to forty-eight hours to be convened, and of 
course, this is useless when dealing with cases of emergency.
102 See Al-Jazeera report on drugs of 6 JUlY 2011, see http://www.alja-
zeera.com/indepth/features/2011/06/201162874544676539.html 
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CIVIl SoCIeTY oRGAnIZATIonS’ 
Role In SeRVInG THe 
PAleSTInIAn CoMMUnITY
The aim of this section is to shed light on the important role 
played by the civil society organizations in the Palestinian context, 
particularly in East Jerusalem; first by defining the concept, 
second by discussing the formation of the Palestinian civil society 
overtime; explaining its development, tasks and functionality. Then 
a desiccation that tackles the foreign aid dependency, and finally by 
highlighting the important role of the civil organizations played in 
East Jerusalem.
The Concept of Civil Society
The concept of ‘Civil Society’ has been in vogue since the 18th and 
19th centuries; however, the 1980s witnessed a revival of interest, 
especially after the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. The 
London School of Economics defines civil society and highlights 
that it “refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around 
shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its institutional 
forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, 
though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, 
family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. 
Civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy 
and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations 
such as registered charities, development non-governmental 
organizations, community groups, women’s organizations, faith-
based organizations, professional organizations, trade unions, self-
help groups, social movements, business organizations, coalitions 
and advocacy groups”103.
103 See http://www2.lse.ac.uk/lSeCities/citiesProgramme/pdf/
bankside123/16GlossaryAW20pgs.pdf
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In the Palestinian case, the formation of the Palestinian civil 
society is unique to its context. The previous review of the “Civil 
Society” concept revealed that it has been always related to 
or work independently from the “State”. It is true that there was 
no Palestinian state before Oslo, and many would argue that the 
contemporary Palestinian Authority is not yet a State either, hence 
the question whether there is a Palestinian civil society, was and still 
is debatable. In reality, and far from the ongoing debate about the 
existence of the Palestinian Civil Society, most of the Palestinian 
Civil Society Organizations emerged and developed in the absence 
of the state, in the absence of national independence and in the 
absence of sovereignty over land and citizenship104.
The Formation of the Palestinian Civil Society 
Historically, the Palestinian Civil Society Organizations started to 
develop in the early years of the twentieth century. In 1907, the 
“Law of Organizations” of the Ottoman Empire had guaranteed 
the right of organizations, but in a limited manner, in order to keep 
control over the formation of nationalist organizations within its 
Arab provinces including Palestine. After Palestine came under 
the British Mandate, a vibrant civil society emerged consisting of 
religious groups, clubs, labor unions, and women’s societies (ARIJ, 
2012)105. However, the Palestinian social networks became strained 
and began to break down due to the displacement of over 750,000 
Palestinians in 1948106. After “Al-Nakba”107 the Palestinian social 
networks reformed themselves again in each geographical enclave 
they have been displaced within whether Jordan, Lebanon or Syria 
or elsewhere. They exist in two forms; the networking charities and 
human rights organizations devoted to defend their civil rights and 
provide relief, and the political parties and mass organizations such 
104 See (Costantini, et al. 2011 )“Mapping Study of Civil Society organi-
zations in the occupied Palestinian territory”  
105 See http://www.arij.org/publications/books-atlas-
es/82-2012/250-social-capital.html
106 See (ARIJ, 2012)
107 Al-nakba is the Arabic word of the word catastrophe in english, it 
indicates to the war of the 1948. 
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as women, youth and workers and many professional unions (Hilal, 
2009). In the West Bank, which was under the Jordanian rule, and 
the Gaza Strip that was under the Egyptian rule, the civil actions 
developed separately during the years (1948-1967). From 1964 on, 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led the civil society 
in both the diaspora and the occupied territories, and it focused 
on voluntary work through youth organizations and health and 
education NGOs (Salem, 2012). Since 1967, these organizations 
were established as an alternative to the Israeli occupation 
authority108. This lasted till the first Intifada in 1987 in which a new 
period emerged; many traditional NGOs related to the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) started to lose ground in the field in 
front of the new grassroots organizations that emerged such as the 
‘popular committees’ that constituted the main participants in the 
first Intifada109. This includes the Islamic charitable organizations 
that began to adopt a new role and understanding of the “political 
participation”, which led to the emergence of Hamas as an active 
participant (Costantini, et al., 2011).
A new era started following the Madrid peace conference110 in 
1991. A considerable amount of funding was received from western 
donors.  After the Oslo Accords of 1993, the PLO became an 
internationally recognized entity and formed the PNA; this motivated 
CSOs to concentrate more on the socioeconomic development 
rather than political and national indoctrination. They moved more 
towards institutionalization and professionalism, replacing political 
funding from the Palestinian political parties with funding from the 
international donors with different conditions111.  That had reduced 
some of the CSOs’ scope of work while opening up other new fields 
108 See (AbuZayyad, 2012) and (Pundak & Khoury, 2012).
109 See the “Mapping Study of Civil Society organizations in the occupied 
Palestinian Territory”. http://www.enpi-info.eu/library/content/civ-
il-society-organisation-mapping-study-palestinian-territories 
110 The Madrid Conference of 1991 was a peace conference, hosted by 
Spain and co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
It was an attempt to revive the Israeli–Palestinian peace process 
through negotiations, involving Israel and the Palestinians as well as 
some Arab countries.
111 See (fuqaha, 2012)
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preferred by the donor community such as democracy, governance, 
gender issues and empowerment with the focus on the youth 
sector112.
The formation of the PNA changed the previous relationship that 
once existed between the PLO and the NGOs. The newly formed 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) began absorbing many civil 
society organizations to serve as ministries, which resulted in 
reducing their number from 1400 organizations in 1993 to less than 
half113. However, many CSOs refused to merge, thus competition 
over funds and activities prevailed as a new phenomenon; in 1997 
the first law draft was presented to the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (PLC) providing for the Ministry of Interior to “license” NGOs 
rather than simply “register” them” (Costantini, et al. 2011: 22). In 
2000, the Palestinian civil society experienced a setback because 
of the outbreak of the second Intifada. Political parties turned to 
armed struggle, and most of the NGOs focused only on providing 
emergency aid instead of their ordinary work114. Peace organizations 
also faced a setback because of the problem of ‘normalization115. 
Only Islamic civil society organizations flourished during this 
period through their grassroots work and their reputation of being 
untainted by corruption (Salem, 2012).
The violent struggle between Fatah and Hamas in June 2007, 
divided the Palestinian civil society into three fragments: one 
supporting Hamas, one supporting the PNA in Ramallah, and the 
third comprising of liberal, democratic, independent organizations 
112 Ibid
113 See Costantini, et al. (2011) who points out that the PnA invited civil 
society organizations to become incorporated in its structures, this 
occurred with some nGos, particularly closely linked to fatah, such 
as the Health Service Council, that ran 62 clinics and merged into the 
PA.
114 See ( Costantini, et al. 2011).
115 normalization is the participation in any project, initiative or activity, 
in Palestine or internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to 
bring together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or 
institutions) without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of 
the Israeli occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression 
against the Palestinian people.”
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(Ibid). The Palestinian Authority (Fatah) in the West Bank carried 
out an intensive campaign against all Hamas CSOs, while Hamas in 
Gaza did the same with Fatah CSOs. (AbuZayyad, 2012).
Foreign Aid Dependency
Since the 1948 War, Palestinians, wherever they settled, became 
deeply dependent on external aid. The UNRWA116 that was 
established right after the 1948 Palestinian Exodus (al- Nakba) 
provided for basic food needs, education and health care to the 
Palestinian refugees. Other UN agencies were present also, like the 
UNDP,117 which provided expert advice, training, and grants support. 
Up to the first Intifada, external aid to the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip came primarily from Arab countries through the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in exile (De Voir & Tartir, 2009) and 
less from the West. During the first Intifada, and because of the 
urgent need for humanitarian aid, many more Western International 
NGOs arrived to channel more money into the Palestinian NGO 
sector, as NGOs and UN agencies were the only available channels 
to deliver humanitarian aid to the oPt’s (Brynen, 1995). After Oslo, 
the Western Donors – as a concession to Israel - took the gearshifts 
of financing the Palestinian development118 directly to the PNA and 
indirectly through the civil society organizations.
The huge increase in external aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
was over 600% between 1999 and 2008; 3.25 billion US Dollars per 
year119. It was based on the assumptions of a vibrant Palestinian 
entity that was done by Palestinian, Jordanian, Israeli, and American 
economists in 1993, before the Oslo negotiations had reached them 
or the public120. This group of economists had recommended that 
116 The UnRWA is the abbreviation for the United nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.
117 The United nations Development Program (UnDP) is the United na-
tions› global development network.
118  See (Challand, 2009)
119 See De Voir & Tartir (2009)
120 As presented by Stanley fischer, Patricia Alonso-Gamo, and Ulric 
erickson von Allmen in their article “economic development in West 
Bank and Gaza since oslo” in 2001.
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the Palestinian economy would be first dominated by the private 
sector in which markets will decide the allocation of resources 
and the creation of a Palestinian economic administration to 
manage the financial system, free trade in goods and capital 
among the Palestinian entity, Israel and Jordan. In addition to this, 
some 100,000 Palestinian workers were again allowed to work in 
Israel121. Finally, foreign aid would have to play a major part in the 
economic development of the new Palestinian entity. Later on, after 
the Oslo agreement and the creation of the PNA, some of these 
conditions were met while the most important ones were not. The 
freedom of trade of goods and services was not valid, neither the 
free movement of the Palestinian labor force, while support from 
the donor community has been generous. According to Fischer et 
al. (2001) and many others, the generous financial aid is definitely 
not responsible for the inadequate growth performance. However, 
the face of external aid and the work of NGOs dramatically changed 
during the Second Intifada (2000-2004); it shifted again from 
development to emergency assistance. By the end of the Second 
Intifada, aid began to shift back from meeting the immediate 
humanitarian needs of Palestinians to long-term development. 
Figure 6: Type of External Aid Disbursed to the WB&GS (2002 – 2008). 
Source: (De Voir & Tartir, 2009:13)
121 The number of Palestinian workers was reduced for security reasons 
during the first Intifada.
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De Voir & Tartir (2009) argue that “though external aid has acted 
as a constant buttress to Palestinians since the War of 1948, the 
manner, type and conduits have changed significantly over time … 
These shifts coincide closely with political realities here in Palestine 
and around the world, rather than local development needs” (De 
Voir & Tartir, 2009: 7). This is clear through the reaction of the 
donor community after certain political events; the international 
response to Hamas’ victory of the Legislative Elections in 2006, for 
example, which was to put a halt to state-building efforts because 
donor’s governments introduced financial sanctions against the 
PA. Another clear-cut example was when fighting erupted between 
Fatah and Hamas in 2007 in which Hamas took control over the 
Gaza Strip. President Abbas appointed an emergency ‘technocratic’ 
government that led to an immediate reversal of the donor financial 
sanctions and the no-contact policies with the PA. This government 
was favorably viewed by the international community; therefore 
they reengaged a development agenda with the PNA in the West 
Bank122.
“There are twenty two social organizations in al-‘Eizariyah. They can 
be categorized according to the type of services they provide such 
as development, healthcare, education and charity, or according 
to the target group such as children, women, youth, disabled, and 
the elderly. Unfortunately, most of these organizations’ community 
services are limited and ineffective; the beneficiaries are usually the 
directors and their relatives, volunteer work is almost disappearing. 
In my opinion, the conditional external funding contributed to this 
failure. Those organizations look for projects that will be accepted 
and financed by the international donors, hence, those projects 
serve the funders’ interests, not the societal needs” (Abdel-Raof al-
Sinawi123, November 28, 2013124).
122 See (De Voir & Tartir, 2009) and the Palestinian Ministry of Planning 
(2008)
123 Abdel-Raof al-Sinawi teaches law at Al-Quds University and is also 
the director of the al-Montada Social Association of al-‘eizariya.
124 This interview was done in 2013  for “The Impact of the Separation 
Wall on the Social Capital of the Palestinians in the West Bank and 
east Jerusalem” PHD dissertation. See:  http://eprints-phd.biblio.
unitn.it/1707/
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In the Palestinian case, it is important to realize that the internal 
issues and the external political process are inevitably inseparable125. 
The debate regarding the external funds’ impact on the Palestinian 
civil society organizations is still ongoing between those who think 
it has a negative impact, those who are in favor of it and those who 
might be considered as neutral and have an analytical approach 
in tackling the situation. However, and with the context depicted 
in this section in mind, the next section will focus on civil society 
organizations in East Jerusalem. 
East Jerusalem and Civil Society Organizations 
In a group session that took place at (hbs) office in Ramallah, on 
August 23rd and on September 7th, 2016, a discussion regarding 
the civil society took place to highlight the complicity from the 
point of view of those who work in the field, especially in East 
Jerusalem areas. The participants were the partner organizations 
of the “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable Palestinian Women and 
Children in East Jerusalem” project. The partners highlighted their 
projects in terms of objectives, target groups and the difficulties 
they faced before and during projects implementation, in addition 
to their suggestions for optimal results. This discussion was in 
line with the previous analyses and arrived to similar conclusions 
with other studies regarding the civil society organizations in the 
oPt’s. The report “Mapping Study of Civil Society Organizations in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory”126 of 2011, for example, points 
out the specific issues regarding the CSOs in East Jerusalem, 
highlighting its special political context that produces a two-fold 
set of challenges. The first is that the CSOs legitimate existence 
and activities are at risk, the second is about the increasing social 
exclusion that creates a growing demand for services and for 
human rights protection activities.
“The Jerusalemites feel lost. Jerusalem is an orphan.  Who is going 
to protect Jerusalem? No Palestinian Authority, no Political Bodies. 
125 See http://www.miftah.org/Doc/PolicyPapers/Policy240408.pdf 
126 See http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/westbank/projects/overview/
index_en.htm 
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This Intifada is spontaneous; Fatah and Hamas are present only as 
individuals not as political players. No civil society organizations 
neither. Israel closed the most important Palestinian institutions in 
East Jerusalem, and those who are still active moved to Ramallah. 
Some CSOs managed to keep their Israeli legal registration but 
they are not efficient. No reference point for the people especially 
women; the only power remained is clan. Only the donor community 
has financial and political means to influence and enforce” (Lama 
Hourani127. August 17, 2016). 
According to the Oslo Agreement, negotiations regarding East 
Jerusalem were postponed till the third year of the Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement of 1995; hence there was no jurisdiction for 
the PNA in East Jerusalem then and until today, as a result of the 
failure of the peace talks. Since Oslo, Israel began to pressure, and 
eventually succeeded in closing the Palestinian institutions in the 
city. As a result, East Jerusalem started to suffer from a severe 
lack of public bodies to address community problems especially 
with the minimal role played by the Palestinian notables128. The 
Jerusalemites are not represented in the municipality of Jerusalem, 
and are heavily neglected in service provision such as education, 
and other services, while at the same time they are forced to pay 
all the municipal taxes, water and electricity bills in addition to 
fines. Discrimination against Palestinians is clear also in garbage 
collection and lack of infrastructure provision such as planning, 
pavement, lighting and sidewalks. Not to mention the difficulties in 
obtaining renovation and building licenses to meet the increasing 
need of housing, and the continuous rising levels of poverty, 
unemployment among youth, and social problems like drugs and 
domestic violence.129 There are only some small community based 
organizations funded by European or other international donors 
127 lama Horani is a program coordinator in Heinrich Böll Stiftung (hbs) 
Association/Ramallah office
128 The notables used to coordinate between the people and the Israeli 
authorities.
129 The poverty level reached more than 70% for the Palestinians of 
Jerusalem by Israeli standards. See hbs news letter (2015): Raja 
Khalidi “Views from Jerusalem”. https://ps.boell.org/sites/default/
files/hbs_eu_project_newsletter_english.pdf 
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who support some local social programs to fill the services gap, 
especially after the closure of the “Orient House”, the leading 
Palestinian political institution in Jerusalem in August 2001130. 
“There was no leadership before Faisal al-Husseini in East 
Jerusalem. I worked with him and was his right hand starting from 
1985. Abul-Abed as he was also called, managed to gather important 
and influential people including women who were heads of charity 
organizations to build a national body. We started many activities 
such as protests against settlements in Silwan among others. The 
first intifada started spontaneously, that is true, but shortly after 
we formed the Unified National Committee to administrate the 
intifada. We started many projects like the Palestinian Housing 
Center to provide housing loans to support the Jerusalemites’ 
steadfastness, in addition to fundraising that targeted the Arab Gulf 
Countries, mainly Qatar, and Turkey for financial support to help all 
sectors such as health, education, tourism, and social problems 
such as addiction, among others. This golden era started to collapse 
because of the militarization of the second Intifada that started in 
2000 and the death of Faisal al-Husseini in mid of 2001” (Fadwa 
Khawaja131, August 29, 2016). 
After Faisal Al-Husseini’s death in May 31, 2001, and the closure 
of the Orient House in August the same year, East Jerusalem had 
no leadership. However, civil society organizations funded by the EU 
and other international donors had an important role in serving the 
community.
“After the killing of (the Palestinian child) Abu Khdeir (in July 
2014), there was a new popular uprising but it’s temporary and 
not structured around a certain aim. In my humble opinion, 
political powers are more efficient in solving social problems than 
organizations. The political objective pushed them to better serve 
the community; this was very clear during the first Intifada. Now, 
and because there is no common objective, no national struggle 
strategy, the civil society organizations became donor’s agents, 
meaning that, their main concern now is to implement the projects 
130 Ibid
131 fadwa Khawaja is the chairwoman /Jerusalem Center for Women 
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funded by the donors” (Lama Hourani, September 7, 2016).
“CSOs work is superficial, show off, and not profound work; it wasn’t 
like this in the past, the PLO used to do all the work” said Fadwa 
Khawaja. Hilal (2011) pointed out that by the end of 1990s there 
were a total of 18 different political parties or organizations in the 
Occupied Territories including East Jerusalem132. However, “the 
present decade saw the re-structuring of the Palestinian political 
field around two major parties, both competing for control of the 
PNA at a conjuncture that saw the possibility of establishing an 
independent state disappear and the Palestinian national project 
reach a dead end” (Hilal, 2011: 17). “The focus should be on the civil 
society organizations, no political solution for Jerusalem, we should 
concentrate our efforts to save the human being. East Jerusalem is 
full of crime, abuse, drugs, selling houses to the Israelis; all these 
crimes have been implanted by Israel” Fadwa Khawaja said.
“The Old City Youth Organizations is located in the Old City, is a 
nonprofit NGO working with the marginalized groups in Jerusalem. 
We depend on grants and projects funded by donors. The people 
in the old city of Jerusalem are facing many problems that affect 
their lives, as no official authority cares for the social, cultural, 
educational and economic development in this area. This makes 
the NGOs responsible for dealing with these hardships coupled 
with restricted and limited resources. The siege and isolation of the 
city caused many negative social diseases such as drugs, violence, 
social and psychological stress, school dropout. These conditions 
lead to more suffering for marginalized groups including women, 
children and the youth. Our program of activities covers two main 
actions; the first is empowerment and educational programs by 
implementing workshops and seminars about the daily problems 
and relevant subjects. The second is skills development, by 
implementing cultural and arts activities, like folklore dancing, 
drama, music, singing and sport. Our aim is to develop the youth 
132 Those with tangible membership or support did not exceed eight 
parties; secular Palestinian nationalist movements, secular Arab 
nationalist movements and Islamist parties, in addition to the «de-
mocracy movement» and the special issue groups (an environmental 
group and a peace group).
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skills by providing a healthy and safe place where they can meet and 
learn and exchange views with trainers and learn how to solve their 
daily problems. As everyone knows, drugs became the first threat 
for the youth in the Old City, followed by divorce and high levels of 
poverty. The number of divorced couples is increasing and while the 
young man moves on with his life, the young woman suffers socially 
and economically. We tried to help the community by involving the 
young generation with social and artistic programs to create new 
interests. At the beginning girls thought these mixed programs 
with boys will harm their reputation; some thought the young men 
participate because they are interested in having intermit relations 
with the girls and not to serve the community or to enhance their 
social abilities. However, through our efforts, they managed to 
evaluate our organizations positively because of the values that we 
believe in and practice, and they learnt to have good and productive 
time, which drove them away from many social problems such 
as drugs and domestic violence. The cultural exchange program 
with a Swedish partner, for example, has given the participants 
new perspective that enhances their commitment to their own 
community” (Sameer Amro133, September 7, 2016).
The common problem that CSOs and CBOs are exerting huge efforts 
to make a successful fundraising, and many are complaining 
about the complicated process. It became less likely that a 
project proposal will be accepted; first because of the high level 
of competition between them, and second because they limit 
themselves to international aid only; they usually refuse to be 
engaged in partnerships with the Israelis or in joint projects with 
mixed Israeli-Palestinian groups although these kinds of projects 
would be generously funded by the municipality. Even foreign aid 
would be easier to obtain if the programs were designed around 
‘peace’ projects or involving Jewish youth and women in their 
activities. They avoid such resources because their aim is to 
enhance resistance and to protect their presence as Palestinians in 
East Jerusalem. Local fundraising is used also especially when it’s 
related to organizations that serve the disabled.
133 Sameer Amro is a project manager in the old City Youth Association 
in the old City of Jerusalem, al Wad Street – Suq al- Quttaneen.
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“We are a partner in the “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable 
Palestinian Women and Children in East Jerusalem” project. Before 
this project, we have been seeking for international financial 
support to cover the cost of our activities for the disabled in the 
area of Ras el Amud, and we were not lucky enough. We approached 
the rich people in the community and we managed to get some 
financial support but only at the beginning, but the problem is 
also with the families of the disabled. Although they get financial 
support from the Israeli national insurance, these families rather 
keep the disabled at home than paying the travelling cost from and 
to the rehabilitation centers.” (Samir Al-A’abbasi134, September 7, 
2016)
Some of the Jerusalemites have been served by the municipality 
community centers. Even though these centers may fill the gap in 
serving the vulnerable groups at least partially, especially after the 
closure of most of the Palestinian CSOs in the nineties, there is the 
problem of “Normalization135” that Jerusalemites try to avoid.
“I live in the Beit Hanina neighborhood with two kids, a boy and a 
girl. After my divorce, I couldn’t face the pain alone, and I am totally 
disconnected from family support because my family lives in 
Jordan. I felt the need for help and I started to use the psychological 
services offered for vulnerable women by the community center 
close to where I live. I had the courage to do so although many 
Jerusalemites refuse to deal with these centers as they are funded 
by the Israeli government. However, I have to confess that they 
helped me overcome my problems, not only by psychotherapy 
sessions but also by providing me with legal advice regarding my 
rights and my children’s rights under the Israeli law, which are by 
far better than what is offered by the sharia law or the Jordanian 
134 Samir Al-A’abbasi is the chairman of nibras Al-Quds Society for Indi-
viduals with Special needs
135 normalization is the participation in any project, initiative or activity, 
in the oPt’s or internationally, that aims (implicitly or explicitly) to 
bring together Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis (people or 
institutions) without placing as its goal resistance to and exposure of 
the Israeli occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression 
against the Palestinian people.
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law, which are still applicable in East Jerusalem and are still used in 
solving family disputes” (Majida136, October 26, 2016). 
There are eight community centers in East Jerusalem, funded by 
the Israeli municipality. However, neighborhoods such as Jabal al-
Mukabir and Silwan refused to host a community center because 
they consider this as an act of “normalization” with the occupying 
power. Their point of view as explained by the report of Budour 
Y. Hassan137 is that these centers are controlled by the Israeli 
municipality, and they actively work to depoliticize Palestinian 
youth. They focus on providing education services and “women’s 
empowerment” activities, but while claiming to support rights to 
education and social services, those rights never include freedom 
from occupation. Aya138, an Arabic teacher activist in the youth 
initiative of Jabal al-Mukabir explained that “these activities aim 
to appease the Palestinian public while sugar-coating colonialism. 
The neighborhoods that resist the establishment of those centers 
established their own, depending on voluntary work and external 
funds; worth mentioning that the level of voluntary work is high in 
these centers, such as the youth initiative in Jabal al-Mukabir and 
the Madaa Center in Silwan. Aya further explained: “any cultural 
activity that we carry out sends a political message of resilience, 
maintaining our Palestinian identity and opposing any normalization 
with the Israeli occupation in all of its arms”.
“We have to empower the civil society organizations to rescue 
East Jerusalem. Lack of funding should not hold them back; 
organizations were created before the donors’ community and 
their financial support. Drugs, sexual harassment and many other 
social problems are spreading. The Israeli policies regarding the 
curriculum and many other vital issues are making the situation 
worse. The work that has been done in Silwan is great but it is 
isolated. One of the Israeli policies is to create small cantons inside 
Jerusalem. The organizations in Jerusalem must unite and if they 
136  Majida is an educated working single mother who was a Jordanian 
citizen before marrying her Jerusalemite husband.
137 Budour Youssef Hassan posted the article on “The electronic Intifada” 
on the 22 october, 2015.
138 Ibid
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agree on one policy and create their own chart, then many problems 
can be solved” (Lama Hourani. August 17, 2016).
When the community faces a natural hazard or a manmade hazard, 
usually the people of this community gets together to face this 
threat. This is what happened in the area of al-Bustan in Silwan, 
where 250 houses were threatened with demolition by the Israeli 
government. A protest tent, later named Om Ayyub tent, was created 
to prevent the Israeli authority action. This tent was transformed 
later into a cultural center. Another example is the peaceful 
protest and the legal follow up against the bodies’ detention of the 
killed Palestinians although it took a long time before the Israeli 
Authorities responded to the people and human rights organization 
efforts. One more example is when many cultural centers in the 
West Bank organized a fund-raising campaign through musical 
events to rebuild the demolished houses of East Jerusalem. These 
campaigns were very successful. Another success-story was the 
campaign against breast cancer that was held in the Ramallah 
cultural center by the well-known Trio Jubran with many other 
musical bands and artists on October 26, 2016. These self-funding 
activities had their own characteristics and do not work in cases 
such as sustainable development projects or programs that 
works on prevention activities to certain social problems such as 
drug addiction. Other organizations had a low cost strategy to the 
ongoing search for fund: 
“The Right to Play way of work depends on two important principles, 
the first is the low cost activities, second the voluntary work. To keep 
our voluntary workers we cover all costs such as transportation and 
food”. (Nida Jahajha, August 23rd 2016). 
This low-cost strategy depends on the type of the organization 
and the type of the target group. However, they still need financial 
support to cover the organization’s running costs including the staff 
salaries. Therefore, sometimes this strategy is not efficient enough 
to solve the fundraising problem:
“The Al-Mortaqa Women Organization was formed in 2006 in 
Jerusalem. The main objective is to develop the capacity of 
- 72 -
Palestinian women in general and women living in Jerusalem in 
particular. Al-Mortaqa aims to empower women economically and 
socially, especially talented women from Jerusalem, who work from 
their own homes. These women cannot afford renting shops in 
Jerusalem and pay high taxes. We thought of launching the first 
“Jerusalem Women Business Incubator “project to improve women’s 
skills to start up their own businesses since the economic situation 
in the city is very difficult. We provide them with training courses in 
project management, life skills and marketing. In addition, we are 
developing a website to promote their products that will provide 
online shopping services in the near future. Our problem was in 
funding. We prepared the project proposal and we applied to many 
international organizations and finally we were lucky to have our 
proposal approved by Heinrich-Boell-Stiftung (hbs) .Regarding the 
difficulties that women are facing,  I would like to highlight the fact 
that those women are generally from the middle-class  and have a 
good level of education and their own ideas but what are missing 
the business advice and the financial support .In general most of 
participants are in need of ongoing financial support and some of 
them decided to withdraw from the program due to lack of financial 
support” (Amani Al-Alem139, August 23rd, 2016).  
The common understanding of “Aid” in the mind of most Palestinians 
is financial aid; if not cash, it should be at least tangible such as 
scholarships, food and clothing. Therefore, most people will not 
be interested in training courses or awareness programs. Fadwa 
Khawaja, who is the chairwoman of the Jerusalem Center for 
Women, said that she once asked each participant in an activity why 
they chose to join. and she discovered that the women had different 
motivations, different objectives and different expectations; one 
said she just wanted to go out of the house and see new people. 
Others thought some kind of aid might be distributed; another one 
participated just because her neighbor was going. 
Most of the debate regarding the International Aid is around the term 
“conditional”, which means that the international donors decide 
the sector and the amount of funding that should be spent on this 
139  Amani Al-Alem, project manager at Al Mortaqa Women Association
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sector. The East Jerusalem Palestinian politician Faisal al- Husseini 
while running the Orient House Organizations, and as a Palestinian 
leader, had the power to impose the allocation of funds whether the 
donor was from the West, such as the EU or from the East such as 
Qatar or Kuwait. He knew what Jerusalem needed and used to ask 
for specific budget for specific sectors (Kawaja and Amro140). 
“From my experience in this domain, I think cooperation among all 
the institutions of civil society is a must. If we do so, gradually we 
get to a specific understanding; we can design projects according 
to the society needs and then submit them to the donors. This 
way we will be the ones who will decide what kind of programs to 
implement. It is not the donors’ problem if we do not coordinate with 
each other to avoid duplication of programs for example. Continuity 
is also important; what is the use of a foreign expert if the project 
will fall apart after he leaves? I think the responsibility lays on us” 
(Naila Ayesh141, September 7, 2016).
Civil society organizations in East Jerusalem failed in creating 
sufficient networking among them, perhaps except for few 
ones; such as the Palestinian Medical Relief Society (PMRS), The 
Agricultural Development Organizations (PARC), and The Palestinian 
Counseling Center (PCC). 99% of East Jerusalem organizations, 
are affiliated with the Fatah party, and do not cooperate with each 
other. There are no partnerships, they work separately, and they act 
as if each organization is a kingdom by itself. Even if any of their 
target groups participate in an activity of another organization, they 
will be punished and they might be excluded from the organizations, 
explained Sameer Amro on September 7, 2016. 
“You are our partners in the “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable 
Palestinian Women and Children in East Jerusalem” program. You 
applied to our international organization for this project funded by 
the European Union; we approved it because your project reflects the 
needs of the targeted groups. This project could be a starting point 
and a cornerstone for the “working together” idea. Each partner of 
140 fadwa Khawaja, August 29 and Sameer Amro, September 7 (2016) 
141 naela Ayesh is the eU Sub-Granting field Coordinator/ Heinrich Böll 
Stiftung (hbs) Association/Ramallah office
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you works in a certain field which is different from the others and 
serves also in different area, which has its own characteristics and 
its specific problems.  Let us stop self-flagellation, we can bring the 
change because we are the ones who know our needs and we are 
the ones who design the programs then submit them to the donors. 
They will be approved accordingly; we have to be optimistic” (Naila 
Ayesh, September 7th, 2016).
The group discussion with the representatives of the partners of the 
EU funded project “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable Palestinian 
Women and Children in East Jerusalem” that was held in hbs office 
in Ramallah reveled important information, critics and opinions. The 
opinion above comes from an experienced Palestinian woman and 
community activist who is familiar with the culture and the political 
context and works on the project. 
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ConClUSIon
In the Palestinian case, it is not possible to separate the humanitarian 
affairs and the socioeconomic status from the political context. 
The following conclusions and recommendations are presented to 
enhance the rights of the vulnerable groups in East Jerusalem who 
suffer from many human rights violations caused by Israel and their 
own culture. Moreover, the following conclusions aim to help the 
international and the local civil society organizations to alleviate the 
constraints that prevent them from reaching their ultimate goals:
•	 The failure of the peace process, within the framework of the 
Oslo Accords, led to a general sense of uncertainty and confusion 
among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories (oPts). The Oslo 
Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1993, 
failed to fulfill the aspirations of the Palestinian people in the 
oPts, including East Jerusalem. The majority of Palestinians 
accept Israel only as an occupier, whether they are holders of 
Israeli passports, or Blue or Green IDs. Therefore, the mutual 
recognition between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) was a golden opportunity for Israel to 
implement peace. The cornerstone was that Palestinians and 
their representatives (the PLO), had recognized the state of 
Israel and accepted to create their state only on the land that 
was occupied in 1967. However, this was only the first step; 
instead of reaching an agreement according to the timetable 
set by the Oslo Accords, negotiations were an endless process 
leading to dead ends because of the Israeli intransigence and 
procrastination.
•	 Since the signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993, Israel has 
continued to confiscate more land, to expand the existing 
settlements, and to build new ones. For many observers, 
Israel deliberately postponed the negotiations regarding East 
Jerusalem to win time and change the demography and the 
character of the city in order to make it difficult to withdraw 
later in case any political solution.
- 76 -
•	 The Jerusalemites feel abandoned; living in a suspended, 
monitored mode, worried about the future in light of the ongoing 
Israeli polices to reduce their number, and the continuous 
efforts to destabilize the consensus about their identity. This 
is coupled with the escalation of restrictions on freedom of 
mobility using various means, such as the construction of the 
segregation wall, which was built not only to separate Israel 
and East Jerusalem from the West Bank but also to isolate 
Palestinian communities from each other by a complicated 
system of checkpoints and bypass roads. Palestinians are thus 
deprived of their very basic human rights; the right to move, to 
travel and to have the ability to plan their future, in addition to 
mental and emotional constraints.
•	 Palestinians on both sides of the Wall are busy with problems 
of their everyday life, which vary according to the different legal 
statuses and the different Israeli policies. This means they do 
not share the same problems and that separates them even 
more.
•	 The Israeli security justification for the construction of the Wall 
has proven false, especially around Jerusalem. This proves the 
human right organizations’ view, in which they see the Wall as a 
new border with the aim to annex more land to Israel, and not as 
a security measure especially since the Wall in East Jerusalem 
separates Palestinians from Palestinians. 
•	 The ideological fragmentation and the political schizophrenia 
amongst Palestinians are reflected by the “normalization” 
issue. On one hand, some envy those who have the possibility 
to enter Israel, whether for work or shopping and entertainment 
and for enjoying several social services. On the other hand, this 
is seen by others as a lack of national affiliation.
•	 Despite the social fragmentation, Palestinians always reunite, 
at least emotionally, during every Israeli collective violation of 
human rights such as bombing Gaza in 2008, 2012 and 2014, 
or the individual attacks by settlers such as the burning of the 
Dawabsheh family and the young Abu Khdeir, in addition to the 
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provocative visits to al-Aqsa mosque. However, with the lack 
of a conscious Palestinian leadership, this power will remain 
latent and random. Therefore, all the Israeli policies are made 
to further weaken and fragment the Palestinians to prevent 
such unity.
•	 Reaching a political arrangement is the favorable way to 
resolve the struggle over East Jerusalem. However, till then, 
the International Community’s intervention at the political level 
is essential to force Israel to see the Palestinians as human 
beings and respect their rights despite the ongoing conflict. 
Israel should protect the Jerusalemites and ensure that they 
enjoy the same rights and welfare like all Israeli residents 
without any kind of discrimination against them. Furthermore, 
the municipality of Jerusalem should implement policies and 
planning schemes at the individual and the community level, 
inside and outside the Wall, in order to compensate for decades 
of neglect.
•	 The Palestinian Authority with the support of the international 
community should find a solution to the absence of law and 
order in Area B of East Jerusalem suburbs. The deterioration 
of these areas has devastating consequences not only for its 
residents but for the whole area of East Jerusalem and other 
areas of the West Bank.
•	 On the humanitarian level, the international organizations’ 
role is vital, not only because they are the only players in East 
Jerusalem for the time being, but also because their services 
became vital in slowing down, if not preventing, the development 
of deterioration especially at the social level.
•	 The Civil Society Organizations’ role became even more 
important especially because of the political vacuum in East 
Jerusalem; therefore, the international donors’ financial 
support to these organizations is vital. For better results, 
the selection of programs and the allocation of funds should 
be decided upon the community needs. In the process, it is 
recommended to avoid bureaucracy, and direct the efforts 
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towards the real work in the field. It is also recommended that 
the programs of the trusted CSOs will be continuously funded 
to enhance sustainability and creativity. 
•	 Cooperation and coordination between CSOs is essential to 
avoid duplication in the programs, target groups and geographic 
locations. The international community could help in putting 
these organizations to work together by designing programs, 
such as the “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable Palestinian 
Women and Children in East Jerusalem” that involves many 
CSOs and covers different sectors.
•	 It is advisable to design special programs directed towards the 
youth for long term and effective results to positively influence 
attitudes in order to change some negative aspects of the Arab 
culture. This will also help in enhancing other values such as 
voluntary work, community service, environmental care and 
recognition of the human rights of vulnerable groups, especially 
the disabled and young females. 
•	 More investment should be made in “women empowerment” 
programs to raise awareness regarding their rights, in order 
to strengthen their abilities to fight against culturally inherited 
customs and laws that consolidate gender inequality. In 
addition, programs that target males to spread the culture of 
equity could support this cause.
•	 There should be more focus on “preventive programs” to raise 
awareness and prevent social problems such as addiction, 
divorce, domestic violence and sexual harassment, in addition 
to the programs that help the target groups to overcome the 
consequences of these problems. 
Palestinians in East Jerusalem are drained, and have lost faith in 
politics and politicians; everybody is busy in securing his and his 
family’s survival, which causes selfishness, and less sense of 
national collectivism. Israel succeeded in extracting East Jerusalem 
from its suburbs; the streets of East Jerusalem are empty from 
its neighboring town’s visitors, the suburbs inside the Wall and 
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outside are suffering from the growing population’s density and 
overcrowdedness. In the near future, accepting to live in chaos will 
simply become a trend in the lives of the next generation. Civil Society 
Organizations remain one of the most important mechanisms to 
help Palestinians to defend their continued presence. Although 
these efforts can soothe their problems, they certainly have no 
power to cure them without a just political solution.
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Summary
In the framework of the EU funded project “Advancing the Rights of Vulnerable Palestinian 
Women and Children in East Jerusalem”, the Heinrich Böll Foundation/ Palestine and 
Jordan has conducted this research to better understand the impact of the current political 
situation on the human rights of the vulnerable Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. 
In this particular case, it is not possible to separate the humanitarian affairs and the 
socioeconomic status from the political context. This study constitutes an effort to analyze 
the context and its various components, highlighting and differentiating between the 
imposed Israeli measures that violate human rights at different levels, and the structural 
macro-social forces that influence the level of human rights protection in the daily life of the 
Jerusalemite Palestinians. 
Furthermore, the study discusses the role played by the international and civil society 
organizations emphasizing the importance of their financial and structural support. The 
civil society organizations remain one of the most important and effective mechanisms to 
ensure the resilience of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem problems. However, reaching a 
political arrangement is the only way to resolve this struggle and this can be only achieved 
through the political intervention and pressure by the international community. 
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